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ABSTRACT 
 
In Latvia, history and remembrance of World War II is a source of contestation between 
the ethnic Latvian majority and the Russian speaking minority. However, despite this 
prevailing idea of two conflicting positions, several studies on public opinion, suggest 
that the memory of Latvians and non-Latvians is more nuanced and different positons on 
20th century history exist also within both ethnolinguistic groups. This thesis looks at 
commemorative rituals of the so called Legionnaire day on March 16, and the 
commemoration of end of World War II on May 8 and May 9 that represent mnemonic 
cleavages between Latvians and the country’s Russian speaking minority. Using 
Bernhard and Kubik’s (2014) theoretical framework of mnemonic actors and memory 
regimes, this study seeks to answer how the diversity of mnemonic positions within both 
ethno-linguistic groups is reflected in the political discourse. Next to that, opportunities 
of mnemonic reconciliation exist are examined. The overall conclusion is that both March 
16 and May 9 present a fractured memory regime in Latvia. The mnemonic cleavages are 
drawn along ethnic lines but within the ethnolinguistic groups different positions were 
found as well. While May 9 is becoming a point of more intense mnemonic contestation 
and it is gaining more prominence, March 16 is increasingly abnegated by major political 
actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Latvia, history and remembrance are a source of contestation between the ethnic 
Latvian majority and the country’s sizeable Russian speaking* minority. Every year 
certain commemorative days draw public attention to the unsettled memory politics 
between the two groups. Researchers have shown that while economically and socially 
there is minimal or no gap between the two groups, symbols, national identity and 
memory are dividing factors between Latvians and Russian speakers (Zepa, Šūpule, 
Kļave, Krastiņa, Krišāne, & Tomsone, 2005).  
Especially dichotomous is the memory of World War II (WWII) where the 
Latvian majority are seeing themselves as victims of Soviet and Nazi occupations while 
the narrative of victory over Nazism dominates within the Russian speaking minority 
(Kaprāns & Procevska, 2013). The restoration of independence is another point where 
memory narratives contradict because in Latvia the memories of restoration of 
independence are inevitably linked with the memories of WWII and Soviet occupation in 
what Eglitis and Ardava (2014) refers to as “layered memory” (p. 126). However, despite 
this prevailing idea of two conflicting positions, several studies on public opinion, suggest 
that the memory of Latvians and non-Latvians is more nuanced (see, for example, 
Cheskin, 2012; Kaprāns & Procevska, 2013; Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017).  
Studies on the identity of Latvian Russians similarly suggest that the group is 
identifying itself with neither the dominant Latvian narratives, nor with the narratives of 
contemporary Russia but develops a group belonging of their own (Cheskin, 2015) and 
feel attached to Latvia as their home country (Zepa et al., 2005). Thus, imposing the 
dichotomous division on collective memories in Latvia is unproductive because it 
requires classification of history narratives as either right or wrong and in such a manner 
rules out possibilities of building bridges between the two groups (Cheskin, 2012.). This 
is echoed by Hanovs (2012) who advocates critical engagement with memory to 
overcome the conflict while Kattago (2010) suggests that memory in the Baltic States 
should be approached from the standpoint of pluralistic democracy that is based on 
tolerance and empathy.  
                                                 
* In academic literature as well as public discourse in Latvia the term “Russian speakers” is preferred to 
Russians because, even though the majority of this community are ethnic Russians, the group includes 
other nationalities as well but as a whole is characterized by the use of Russian as first language. 
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Nevertheless, it is unclear if these trends towards a more pluralistic understanding 
of history have also entered the more institutionalized levels of memory. Quite the 
opposite, “the agony of politics” is dominating the debate on memory (Kattago, p. 390) 
and in both ethno-linguistic groups political parties as well as different civil society 
organisations are solidifying their identities and certain collective memories as a crucial 
part of them (Hanovs, 2012). Political actors have a significant role in institutionalizing 
memory and they also often manipulate with memory issues for political benefit. 
Therefore, it is useful to look at official memory in Latvia, i.e. the memory discourse that 
is put forward by the agents who are holding power or operating in the political arena 
(Bernhard and Kubik, 2014). For this analysis it is relevant that ethnic cleavage prevails 
in party politics in Latvia. The division between parties representing ethnic Latvians and 
the Russian speaking minority overruns the traditional left-right spectrum in Latvian 
politics. A considerable body of research indicates that political parties in Latvia tend to 
exploit ethnic tensions to gain popular support (Nakai, 2014; Zepa et al., 2005). 
Upholding dichotomous memory and manipulation with historic narratives can be a part 
of such political strategies.  
 This leads to the need for a careful examination of political actors as agents that 
form official memory. This thesis focuses on narratives of history and commemoration 
that have been voiced in the Latvian political space during significant anniversaries of 
historical events. This study builds on the theoretical framework presented by Bernhard 
and Kubik (2014) in “Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and 
Commemoration”. These authors look at commemoration of the fall of communism in 
Central and Eastern Europe around the 20th anniversary of these events. Similarly to 
Bernhard and Kubik this study looks at commemoration as carriers of official memory. It 
extends their framework to the commemorative rituals of WWII events that constitute a 
significant mnemonic confrontation on societal and political level in Latvia. Those are 
March 16 – the unofficial remembrance day of the Latvian Legion, which was a formation 
of Latvian soldiers that fought on the side of Germany during WWII, and commemoration 
of the end of WWII that is marked on May 8 and May 9.  
Bernhard and Kubik argue that political environment is composed of mnemonic 
actors who either defend a single narrative, accept a pluralistic vision of history or avoid 
issues pertaining to history and memory. The interaction between different types of 
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mnemonic actors leads to particular memory regimes where there is either one narrative 
of the past event (“unified regime”), several accepted narratives (“pillarized regime”) or 
conflicting narratives (“fractured regime”). The gist of the theory is that the presence of 
at least one mnemonic warrior – an actor who only accepts one version of history - leads 
to a fractured memory regime. Eglitis and Ardava (2014) study the memory regime in the 
Baltic States concerning the restoration of independence and the events leading up to it at 
the time of their 20th anniversary. They find that the memory regime in Latvia is deeply 
fractured and that divisions exist along ethnic lines. However, they too acknowledge a 
division within Latvians, some of who are critical of the political and economic 
developments after independence.     
The conclusion that mnemonic divisions exist only between ethnic groups 
contradicts the studies that indicate within group variation. Because a fractured memory 
regime occurs both when only one warrior is present and when everyone takes a warrior 
position, this classification tells little about the nuances of memory politics. Pettai (2016) 
suggests the need for a qualitative dimension of memory regimes because “the quality of 
fractured memory regime can vary considerably depending on the degree to which the 
mnemonic debates and divisions touch upon more principled issues of national identity 
or state legitimacy” (p. 174). In the Latvian case it is also useful to look at whether both 
ethnolinguistic groups are dominated by mnemonic warriors. The centrality or 
marginality of warrior narratives is also important because it can have an effect of the 
possibility of mnemonic reconciliation on societal level. Political elites are crucial in 
avoiding destabilizing effects that memory conflicts can have on democracies (Bernhard 
and Kubik, 2014). If politicians are not participating in the mnemonic conflict or are 
taking more pluralistic views, the possibility of reconciliation and sideling divisive 
positions is greater than if everyone takes a warrior position. In addition, finding common 
positions could serve as an indicator of what narratives are accepted by both groups.  
This gives an insight into how incompatible the different positions within the 
mnemonic field of Latvia are. I use the classification of mnemonic actors into warriors, 
pluralists, prospectives and abnegators developed by Bernhard and Kubik (2014) in order 
to examine positions of political actors regarding the Legionnaires Day and end of WWII 
commemorative days, which are particularly contested in Latvia. Commemoration of the 
end of WWII on May 9 - Victory Day is widely celebrated by Latvian Russians, while 
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May 8 is the official observance commemorating victims of the war. March 16 is a 
remembrance day that is accepted among many Latvians while it has been vocally 
condemned by Russian speakers.  Bernhard and Kubik’s model enables to determine what 
mnemonic positions the political actors in Latvia take on these events and how likely they 
are to accommodate different versions of history.  
Thus, the purpose of the study is to determine if support exists for mnemonic 
pluralism and what types of mnemonic narratives are present and whether mnemonic 
actors only take positions that reinforce dichotomy. First I look how the diversity of 
mnemonic positions within both ethno-linguistic groups is reflected in the political 
discourse or in Bernhard and Kubik’s terms how the memory regime within both 
ethnolinguistic groups is constituted. In addition I aim to establish to what extent 
interpretations of history exist that both sides accept and which present opportunities of 
mnemonic reconciliation.  These findings demonstrate the main points of contestation 
and the likeliness of reconciliation. The political actors are theoretically able to create 
more inclusive top-down narratives. This study shows if such attempts have been made 
or the opposite – if political elites are indeed the ones perpetuating mnemonic fissures 
and there is a need for an improved political culture.  
 The study is structured as follows. I first explain the concept of collective memory. 
Next, I turn to Bernhard and Kubik’s model and outline the types of mnemonic actors and 
memory regimes. In chapter 2 the cleavages in interpretation of history are described 
based on a review of existing research. This chapter is concluded by an insight in ethnic 
divisions in Latvian party politics. Further, I proceed with outlining the methodology and 
then I apply the model to mnemonic positions on March 16 in 2014 and May 8/9 in 2015 
that present anniversaries of the respective historical events. I conclude with a discussion, 
reviewing the results and outlining the likely implications of such memory regimes on 
Latvian politics.  
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1. CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES FOR STUDYING COLLECTIVE 
MEMORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE  
1.1. The concept of collective memory   
The concept of collective memory was first developed by the French philosopher and 
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwachs (1980) argued that individual memory 
interacts with the environment and what one remembers depends on the group he or she 
belongs to. Different groups can remember the same events in contrasting ways because 
memory is selective and each of these groups create interpretations that are based on their 
social interactions. Since Halbwachs and with the raise of constructivism, collective 
memory has been an important area of research in social sciences, especially social 
psychology, sociology and history but also increasingly in political science. Memory is 
not treated as a mere reproduction but “an active and constructive process” where “past 
is remade for present purpose” (Olick, 1999, p.341). Mechanisms of collective 
remembering have been widely discussed and theorized, trying to determine the effects 
that mnemonic manipulations have on politics.  
Collective memory is dealt with on different levels. Aleida Assmann (2004) 
distinguishes four formats of memory: individual, social, political and cultural. Individual 
memory concerns personal experience that is voluntarily or involuntarily recalled. The 
other three types of memory are collective. Social memory is formed during one’s 
interaction with other individuals, both familiar and unknown contemporaries who 
experience the same events. In this respect, Assmann puts particular emphasis on 
generational memory that is shared by people who belong to one generation. She states 
that “[t]he change of generation is paramount to the renewal and reconstruction of societal 
memory” (ibid, p. 23). The generational memory can, however, be transferred onto next 
generations in the form of symbols like monuments or commemorative rituals, In this 
way certain memories become an important part of a group’s identity that transcends the 
generation by whom particular events were experienced. Nora (1989) refers to such 
carriers of memory as lieux de mémoire – sites of memory.   
Such symbols are the carriers of political and cultural memory that in contrast to 
social memory are institutionalized ways of remembering. These symbols create top-
down narratives that are durable as opposed to social and individual memory that present 
bottom-up narratives. Political and cultural memory correspond to Olick’s (1999) 
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characterization of collective memory that he contrasts to “collected memory” where the 
latter is a result of compilation and interaction of individual memory. Political memory 
is not something a group simply has. It is formed by the group that constructs a coherent 
narrative and as such, it can become a tool for ideological manipulations. Political 
memory is very selective in order to create a positive self-image and produce a narrative 
that fits with present conditions and future visions of the collective entity. For instance, 
Assmann (2004) writes that hegemonic nations are more likely to remember victories 
while the smaller nations that have a “victim identity” focus on defeats, commemorate 
their suffering as a unifying factor and create martyr “tragic hero” narratives. The key in 
any national memory is a “heroic narrative”. Hence, only victims that can be portrayed 
as having suffered for a cause can function, distinguishing it from traumatic experience 
where victims are deprived of all their agency (ibid., pp. 27, 28).  
The function of cultural memory is to ensure “survival” of the group. Cultural 
memory can transcend generations because it is enshrined in material representations and 
rituals. According to Jan Assmann (1995) cultural memory is “… a collective concept for 
all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a 
society and one that obtains through generations in repeated societal practice and 
initiation” (p. 126). It transcends the present because it has “fixed points” or events that 
are maintained in the cultural memory though materialization and institutionalization in 
the form of texts, memorials, monuments, films, buildings, commemoration procedures 
and other forms that Assmann calls "figures of memory” (ibid. p. 129). Cultural memory 
preserves information that is crucial for group’s identity and helps distinguish it from 
others.  
Political scientists study the impact memory has on identities and ideologies as 
well as how memory influences collective action and identity of such units as states and 
nations (Assmann, 2004). Bernhard and Kubik (2014) state that political science focuses 
on “strategies that political actors employ to make other remember in certain, specific 
ways and the effects of such mnemonic manipulations” (p. 7, authors’ emphasis). They 
see political actors as “cultural-political entrepreneurs” who actively shape collective 
memory and are also able to change dominant narratives (ibid., p. 28). Such activity can 
be particularly visible in countries in transition such as the former communist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Regime change is not only a political and economic turn 
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but it also requires “reformulation of collective identities and the introduction or 
reinvigoration of principles of legitimizing power” (ibid., p.8). Revision of society’s 
collective memory is one part of the transition. To study societies in transition, Bernhard 
and Kubik have developed a framework of mnemonic actors and memory regimes that is 
explained in the next subchapter.  
 
1.2. Mnemonic actors and memory regimes  
This study uses the theoretical model presented by Bernhard and Kubik (2014) to classify 
the actors in Latvian political environment. This framework presents how interaction 
between four different types of mnemonic actors leads to memory regimes where there is 
either one narrative on the past event, several accepted narratives or conflicting opposite 
narratives. Their theory pertains to official memory which they define as a form of 
collective memory that is “propagated by the state but also by political parties and other 
actors in the public space” (p.8). In a narrow understanding, official memory requires 
involvement from the government, public authorities and/or political parties.  
Mnemonic actors is Bernhard and Kubik’s interpretation can be individuals as 
well as organizations such as political parties who take a certain stance on a memory 
event or issue. The four types of actors are pluralists, warriors, abnegators and 
prospectives. Prospectives are characteristic to revolutionary movements and, as 
Bernhard and Kubik conclude, they are not relevant in the given context. Therefore in the 
following description of actors I only include the first three types.  
Mnemonic warriors promote one mythical vision of the past. Warriors believe in 
a single truth about history and see themselves as its guardians while all the others are 
propagating “wrong” versions of history. In warriors’ opinion, history is non-negotiable 
and they have to make others accept the “right” version of history. Hence warriors are 
striving to delegitimize other interpretations. Warriors most often see events through a 
frame of nostalgia for the better times in the past or the opposite – a past that has been 
entirely negative. For example, Latvians often refer to present thorough the lens of 
idealized first independence period or bad times during the Soviet occupation. Russian 
speakers in turn tend to refer to the Soviet period as the good times that are lost. Warriors 
consider the true vision of history to be a fundament of the present polity. Therefore, they 
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delegitimize the ones who hold different views on the past and perceive them with 
antagonism.  
Pluralists, in contrast, think that others are “entitled” to their own interpretation 
of the past. If these actors consider others’ interpretation of past to be wrong, they are 
ready to engage in a dialogue to find a common ground. Pluralists are concerned with 
building a field of memory where different versions can coexist. Reconciliation of 
conflicting memories is a goal of mnemonic pluralists. In this case, neither of the historic 
periods is seen in exclusive terms.  
The last type - abnegators are actors who avoid bringing up or taking positions on 
topics that relate to history and memory. These actors are either simply not interested in 
the past or cannot benefit from memory entrepreneurship. They focus on the present and 
do not find engaging in discussions about memory useful. The reasons for choosing an 
abnegator position can be a true disinterest in the past, agreement with the dominant 
narrative or lack of political benefit from taking a warrior position. Memory issues do not 
figure in these actors’ discourse. Another reason for taking an abnegator past is “politics 
of purposive forgetting” – a conscious choice to exclude some memories from political 
environment (p. 14).  
 Bernhard and Kubik stipulate that different combinations of these actors form 
certain memory regimes. Memory regime is “(1) an organized way of remembering a 
specific issue (2) at a given moment” (ibid, p.16). The definition tells that memory 
regimes are not solid. They can change over time, for example, when an actor brings a 
new narrative about history into the public space or when an anniversary of a particular 
memory event increases salience of its interpretation. Taken together all the memory 
regimes “in a given country in a given period can be called the official field of (collective 
or historical) memory” (ibid.).  
In total Bernhard and Kubik classify three types of memory regimes. If all actors 
are abnegators, the memory regime is “unified”, meaning that there is one version of 
explaining history and nobody is interested in challenging it or history and memory are 
simply not salient for political actors. A combination of pluralists and abnegators leads to 
a “pillarized” memory regime where history is debated but actors accept that individuals 
can hold different, equally legitimate versions of history. In contrast, when there is at least 
one mnemonic warrior in the public space, the memory regime is called “fractured”. As 
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warriors only accept their own interpretation of history, fractured memory regimes are 
characterized by conflicts on memory issues.  
One caveat to this framework is that it is very actor-centric and assumes that actors 
are able to rationally calculate costs and benefits of their actions. Thus it stipulates that in 
a fractured memory regime political forces uphold mnemonic cleavages because they can 
exploit positions on salient memory issues for their political benefit. Bernhard and Kubik, 
however, do acknowledge structural factors such as the wider societal context in which 
official memory is embedded. They argue that the he actors need to take such constraints 
into account if they want to remain credible. They outline two types of constraints: 
cultural and structural.  
The first type is cultural constraints that determine what discourses are accepted 
in society. Cultural constraints concern actors’ own beliefs, values and identities. 
Particular audiences hold certain visions of history and have a particular individual and 
social memories. Official communication and education systems reproduce and 
disseminate official narratives while informal networks can maintain unofficial narratives 
that are different from the official ones. As Assmann (2004) states cultural memory is 
“active” and “archival” – some artefacts are used some are stored but still available to 
bring up and create new narrative, reshape the existing ones or they can become salient 
when circumstances change. If a mnemonic actor tries to propagate something that is out 
of these limits, his or her position is most likely to be dismissed as illegitimate. The other 
type is structural constraints that determine whether the actor has the ability to set a trend 
in how particular events are remembered. Potentially the more prominent the actors or 
the more powerful is their position, the more access they have to shaping collective 
memory. In the post-transition situation also political actor’s background, how they are 
perceived by others and their former relation to the old regime constrain the choices. 
It follows that the motivation of actors to choose particular strategy is usually 
based on cost-benefit reasoning and/or their own cultural convictions. In the first case, 
mnemonic actors use history as an instrument to legitimize their right to hold power. 
Actors think about political benefits when choosing to take, for example, an abnegator or 
a warrior position. The second depends on actors’ personal identities and background. 
Very strong cultural motivation to an extent that political costs remain of secondary 
importance is characteristic to radical warriors. In reality, however, a mixture of the two 
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determine actors’ choices.  Bernhard and Kubik argue that successful actors would find a 
way to optimize the cultural and political strategies.  
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2. ETHNIC CLEAVAGE AND DIVIDED MEMORY IN LATVIA 
2.1. Ethnic cleavage and the different interpretations of history  
2.1.1. Origin of mnemonic cleavage, dominant mnemonic narratives and WWII 
commemoration rituals   
Integration of the Russian speaking minority has been an important issue in Latvia since 
1990s. The citizenship and language policies of the restored country were focused on 
reversing the consequences of the Soviet occupation and rebuilding a Latvian nation state. 
Latvia’s Russian speaking population saw a swift change in their status from being on top 
of the socio-linguistic hierarchy to being largely excluded from the nation-building 
process in the 1990s (Zepa et al., 2005). Latvian became the only official language and 
large parts of the Russian speaking community did not automatically receive Latvian 
citizenship but could only later obtain it in a naturalization process that included tests of 
Latvian language skills, knowledge of history, culture and state institutions of Latvia. For 
long language, especially the question of minority schools, was seen as the most important 
potential source of conflict between the two ethno-linguistic groups in Latvia (Zepa et al., 
2005). However, memory politics gained momentum in the Baltic States after the so 
called “Bronze Night” in Estonia’s capital Tallinn when protests broke out after a decision 
of the Estonian government to move a Soviet war memorial from Centre Tallinn to a war 
cemetery (Ardava, 2015). This incident brought to spotlight the two different collective 
memories and contributed to interest in memory politics not only in Estonia but also in 
Latvia.  
Collective memory in the Baltic States was an important part of the independence 
movement. The shift of power after the independence from the Soviet Union came with 
a shift in officially acknowledged memory (Onken, 2010). It was a tool that helped unite 
people around a common cause. Latvian memory researcher Vita Zelče (2009) argues 
that “[c]ollective memory also created a future myth – the image of an ideal, free and 
independent Latvia – which inspired the movements of the National Awakening” (p. 46). 
Victims of the Soviet regime became the central element of the Latvian collective 
memory and also a focal point for Latvian identity.  The Soviet period in Latvian 
collective memory is seen as passive – people have no agency and the victimization 
narrative included not only people who had directly suffered from repressions but also 
“lost years” for all the Latvians who had to live under Soviet occupation (ibid, p 56). In 
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line with Burke (1989) social memory and past are especially important as the groups that 
find their cultural roots threatened and this is characteristic to Latvians who felt that their 
language, culture and memory are at peril as a result of Soviet occupation and dominance 
of Russian language.  
New places and rituals of commemoration focusing on the victims of the Soviet 
past were a symbolic repayment to the victims and also a symbolic institutionalization of 
Latvian social memory. The memories that were oppressed under the Soviet rule were 
now institutionalized through “law and education, historiography and the establishment 
of commemoration dates and practices” (Onken, 2010, p. 285). The new national memory 
was, however, from the very beginning almost exclusively shared only among the 
majority ethnic groups. Acceptance of one version of history became central in the nation-
building while memories that did not fit in the collective victimhood narrative did not 
enter the national memory (ibid.). Brügemann and Kasekamp (2008) argue that “[i]n the 
case of the post-Soviet Baltic States, the politics of memory created a “real” history that 
was based upon a common understanding of collective victimhood under Soviet rule, thus 
excluding the Russian-speaking minority from this state-building memory community” 
(p. 426). As a consequence, the Russian speaking community perceived it as strategic 
exclusion of their versions of history (Onken, 2010).  
As many non-Latvians did not identify with the new narrative, they filled the gap 
with maintaining their own account of the past. Collapse of the Soviet Union was an 
identity crisis for Latvia’s Russian speaking community and they suddenly obtained a 
new status of aliens who had arrived under an illegal occupation. Policy of the Latvian 
state was perceived as discrimination and created “alienation from the Latvian state and 
from the values of Latvian history and memory” (Zelče, 2009, p. 48). The main point of 
dispute became the fact of occupation of Latvia that was hard to accept for the Russian 
speaking minority as it did not really provide a space to include non-Latvians. The new 
narrative was based on collective victimhood of Latvians and a division into the “good” 
and the “bad times” – independent Latvia in 1920s and 1930s versus the Soviet 
occupation. In this narrative the Russian speaking minority belongs to the “bad times”. 
“The good times” in the 1920s and 1930s was a unifying narrative for the again 
independent Latvia but the Russian speaking community often could not relate to this 
period (ibid.). In turn, victory over Nazism in the “Great Patriotic War”, glorification of 
  
18 
 
the Soviet Union and resentment of Russia’s lost influence became an important nodal 
point in their collective memory (Cheskin, 2012). As the new Latvian history did not 
include them, the Russian speakers resorted to the Soviet propagandistic versions of 
Latvian history and contemporary Russian history. This has led to the existence of two 
divergent collective memories in the Latvian society. Contrary to the Latvians, Russian 
narrative of WWII saw Russians as bearing the biggest suffering in the fight against 
Nazism (ibid., 2012). Further alienating factors have been a divided media space as well 
as the influence of Russian media on Russian speakers in Latvia as well as education 
policies in Latvia, which caused an increased resentment with the government among 
Latvia’s Russian speakers (Wezel, 2016).  
Divided media space and interpretation of history in Russian Federation are 
additional factors that contribute to the conflicting mnemonic field. Studies show that 
Latvia’s Russian speaking community is heavily influenced by a media environment 
(Zepa et al., 2005). Wezel (2016) therefore stresses the influence of memory politics in 
Russia on the views of Russian speakers in Latvia, arguing that “[c]urrent Russian 
memory politics block any attempts to thoroughly and critically evaluate the role of the 
Soviet Union during World War II” (p. 570).  Lack of repentance, absence of pluralistic 
debate on history and consolidation of pride of USSR as a having been a great power, 
which is, for example, manifested in the triumphant May 9 celebrations, resonates in the 
Russian speaking community in the Baltic States (Zelče, 2009). Brüggemann and 
Kasekamp (2008) suggest that victory over Nazi Germany as a unifying component of 
Russian identity is accepted among the Baltic Russian minorities because it fills the gap 
that was created as they could not accept the memory cultivated by the ethnic elites. 
Hence, the fact that certain memory is sacralised in Russia has impact on the lack of 
pluralistic memory in the Baltics. Cheskin (2012) comes to similar conclusion stating that 
the Soviet victory over Nazism and the liberation narrative has become a “nodal point” 
for the identity of the Russian speaking community. In his words “nodal points are 
privileged discursive points which allow us to find meaning in an otherwise contested, 
meaningless, and non-universalized world” (p. 564). All in all, this contributes to two 
completely opposite memory narratives in Latvia– one based on condemnation of Soviet 
past while the other is built around its glorification.  
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However, not all researchers who have studied collective memory in Latvian 
agree with the opinion that there are two dichotomous memories. While, for example, 
while Brüggemann and Kasekamp (2008) compare the international division between 
Estonia and Russia to the domestic division between Estonians and Russian speakers, 
Cheskin (2015) suggests that the Russian speaking minority in Latvia is building its own 
identity that gradually includes the official memory that is propagated by the Latvian 
state. Russian language is pivotal to this identity while the political affection towards 
Russia is weakening. Nevertheless, Russia still remains culturally and politically 
attractive. Earlier survey data on integration have shown that Russian speakers prefer 
integration to assimilation – they want to maintain their cultural and linguistic identity 
(Zepa et al., 2005) and data on social memory suggests that Latvian Russians want to 
maintain certain ways of interpreting 20th century history as well (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 
2017).  
Likewise Eglitis and Ardava (Eglitis & Ardava, 2014) offer an additional 
mnemonic narrative to the two dichotomous positions. In total they thus identify three 
narratives characterizing remembrance of the period of restoration of independent Latvia. 
The first “ethnic elite political narrative” is put forward by Latvian political elite and state 
institutions and pictures the past as a triumphant development towards “progress” and 
“freedom” (p. 126). The second, “political and economic alienation narrative” questions 
the legitimacy of the actions of the new political elites and is based on resentment that the 
new regime has not delivered what the independence movement was struggling to 
achieve. The third “ethnic alienation narrative” exists within the Russian speaking 
minority and is based on glorification of the Soviet past and resentment about the present. 
Even though Eglitis and Ardava’s analysis adds a third narrative to the binary Latvian – 
Russian-speaker distinction, Pettai (2016) is critical to this distinction. She points to the 
lack of representation of the second narrative in official memory and also to the fact that 
only the first and the third narrative are really based on group identity and concern core 
values of the state and legitimacy of past events. The resentment rather comes from 
dissatisfaction with current politics, it does not involve a particular interpretation or 
reformulation of the past.  
Another factor that has influenced official memory in Latvia is Europeanization. 
Preparing for its accession to the European Union and NATO, Latvia had to westernize 
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its memory. “Mnemonic accession criterion” stipulated that acceding countries had to 
give more prominence to Holocaust remembrance and evaluate Nazi collaboration 
(Neumayer, 2015, p. 3). This was indeed done and a more balanced accounts of the past 
emerged (reference). At the same time, after the accession to the EU, the new member 
states became mnemonic warriors on the EU level. Central and Eastern European 
countries wanted to see recognition of their suffering under Nazis and communism (ibid.). 
Mälksoo (2009) argues the reason for this mnemonic entrepreneurship to include the 
experiences of communism in European memory has been “fundamental insecurity” of 
these countries about the place of own the past and their belonging to Europe (p. 655). As 
a result, the mnemonic actors in Latvia are stranded between the need to adopt a more 
“European” memory and the sense of injustice that they derive from it.  
 
2.1.2 The role of history and researchers  
 In developing pluralistic vision of the past, history as a discipline plays an 
important role. Despite history and memory being two distinct concepts, they are closely 
related. Both memory and history are subject to socially conditioned “unconscious 
selection, interpretation and distortion” (Burke, 1989, p. 98). Burke separates history and 
social memory arguing that the latter is a “product of social groups” while history is 
consciously undertaken reconstruction of the past according to certain methodology. Yet, 
historians pick what to write about in line with the point of view of their groups in a 
process of selection and interpretation because the past can be assessed “only through the 
categories and schemata of our own culture” (ibid., p. 99). In other words, even though 
in a democracy historians can work freely, they have to comply with the norms and values 
of the environment. The initial function of history in Latvia was to provide the new states 
with legitimacy. During the National Awakening, history was the main political tool for 
mobilization and it was written not only by historians but also journalists, writers and 
politicians. The discipline was underfunded and dominated by the victim narratives and 
struggles to bring to light the “truth” about the past rather than balanced, comprehensive 
investigation (Zelče, 2009). Zelče argues that therefore in Latvia relationship with the 
past is unsettled. It has been dealt with emotionally and chaotically which has hindered 
the development of historical responsibility. She describes historical responsibility as 
looking at history through critical lens and undertaking self-assessment and developing 
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the ability to avoid transfer of past resentments onto present. Instead history as a science 
was replaced by myths of the mono-ethnic collective memory that contributed to a strong 
victim identity of Latvians as a nation that had suffered more than anyone else.  
History-making was altered when Latvia prepared to join the European Union and 
had to align its history with that of the EU. However, the undertaking of the academics 
remained in the self-sufficient frame of finding the true and objective history. Moreover, 
historians were unlikely to engage with collective memory or the vernacular history thus 
the more solid and fact based interpretations of history did not enter the collective 
memory. An additional factor that contributes to mistrust of Russian speaking community 
in the work of Latvian historians is that history still mainly reflected the Latvian collective 
memory and had close relation to the state institutions. Also, mostly it is carried out by 
ethnic Latvian historians which further contributed to exclusion of the minorities’ 
memories from the official narratives (Zelče, 2009).  
 A recent trend, nonetheless, is an increasing discussion on history and memory in 
the academia that reaches out to the media and thus to wider society.  In 2012 a Social 
Memory Research Centre was established at the University of Latvia with the aim of 
seeking strategies for unification of Latvian society (UL Press Centre, 2012). Hanovs 
(2012) argues that the work of academics, however, has not entered political discourse 
where a distinction between right and wrong memories are perpetuated. In his view, the 
Soviet falsifications that are alive in individual memory must be actively engaged with 
and deconstructed. Simple dismissal of “forbidden” memories creates resistance, 
perception of threat to particular individual or group’s memory and a tendency of self-
exclusion which in turn make this group susceptible to political manipulation.  
 
2.1.3 Bottom-up memory   
Different stories about history are emerging in Latvian culture and arts. In 2015 The New 
Riga Theatre featured a performance called “The Lake of Hopes” telling an 
autobiographic story of the producer – a Latvian Russian who is struggling to live in two 
worlds: one where his mother represents the elderly generation that is nostalgic for the 
Soviet era and cherishes the celebration of May 9 and his own where he is part of the 
Latvian society and would mark a commemoration of victims of the war on May 8 (Cerību 
ezers, n.d.). This play, similarly to an earlier performance at the same theatre “The 
  
22 
 
Grandfather”, received an award as the best theatre performance of the year. “The 
Grandfather” also revealed the many different versions of the WW2 memory through a 
personal autobiographical account of an actor who was searching for his grandfather who 
was lost during the war (Vectēvs, n.d.). The play tells three different stories of three 
different men that he found. These two plays one coming from Latvian environment, the 
other narrating the problematics of Latvian Russians, reflect on collective memory that is 
not unified in either of the ethnic groups.  Other reflections on WWII memories in culture 
and arts are listed by Rozenšteine, Saulītis, Siliņa and Zelče (2011).  
However, these are not just activities in arts and culture that show pluralism in 
memory. Several studies have indicated that young Russians in Latvia feel differently 
about narratives on history that their parents and grandparents. Cheskin (2012) after 
surveying participants of the 9 May celebration at the Victory monument in Riga points 
to likeliness of younger Russian speakers to accept different narratives on history. 
Although the views are still far from fully fledged pluralism, his study shows that among 
younger Russians there is a modest inclination incorporate the “Latvian memory myths” 
in their own interpretation of history. Cheskin concludes that attributing the historic 
memory of Latvia’s Russian speaking minority to the influence of Russia, although 
somewhat fair, is too simplistic and overrides the complexity of how memory is shaped 
and how different narratives interact. The result is a dichotomy between the two narratives 
that is almost impossible to overcome. The idea of a generational change offers a more 
optimistic view, assuming that increasingly pluralistic understanding of history is 
emerging from below within the Russian-speaking community. According to Cheskin 
such bottom-up trends eventually enter and changed the “totalized memory-myths” (p. 
564).  
Yet, Kaprāns and Procevska (2013) deny the conciliatory effect of a generational 
change. Their extensive research on social memory in Latvia shows that radicalization is 
increasing among the youth of both ethnic groups. They have observed that among youth 
the attitude towards the events of World War II and its participants as well as 
commemorative rituals and places are more confrontational than among elderly people 
who actually still have memories of the war or middle aged people. The Russian youth is 
more likely to condemn the people who fought in the German army as accomplices in 
Nazi crimes while considering Red Army veterans heroes. Nevertheless, Kaprāns and 
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Procevska (2013) also point to the existence of diverging opinions within both groups 
that are even more significant than the interethnic cleavage. Moreover, segments of both 
groups, especially older people, have a common perception of World War II participants 
on both sides as victims.  
However, social surveys show considerable differences in how different periods 
and historical events are perceived in both ethnolinguistic groups. Most importantly, the 
majority of Russian speakers assess the Soviet period positively and the restored Latvia 
negatively. Among Latvians the results are opposite and the number of people who assess 
the Soviet period negatively has increased between 2012 and 2017 (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 
2017). Also, the conflict of occupation is still salient with the majority of Russian 
speakers not supporting the official Latvian state position on history (ibid.).  
All in all, the conclusions of the social memory survey carried out in 2012 and 
2017 suggest that the bottom-up memory among Latvia’s Russian speaking minority is 
quite pluralistic and meaningful differences exist also in how Latvians see historical 
events. In addition, the latest survey shows that the majority of inhabitants of Latvia 
(55%) are ready to accept different interpretations of 20th century history. At the same 
time, a similar majority within both ethnic groups of the population take a mnemonic 
abnegator positon and want to see less public discussion on contested historical events 
(Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017). This presents a fertile soil for political elites to engage in 
mnemonic reconciliation and the possibility to avoid memory conflicts. Further in this 
study I look into to what extent the different interpretations of history also proliferate in 
the political discourse. However, prior that it is necessary to provide a short insight into 
Latvian political environment and party politics.  
 
2.2 Ethnic cleavage in party politics 
In the Latvian case, official memory encompasses not only the narratives propagated by 
state authorities and parties that represent the dominant national narrative but also parties 
representing the narrative that is accepted within the Russian-speaking minority. Thus, 
official memory in Latvia includes the narratives on history that is widely accepted among 
country’s Russophone population even if they diverge from the generally accepted 
opinion in the state institutions. In official state rituals, however, only the collective 
memory of Latvian ethno-linguistic groups is firmly institutionalized (Pettai, 2016). 
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However, Russian speakers (and also their collective memory) are represented in the party 
system.  Further on I look into party politics in Latvia because for researching official 
memory, it is necessary to establish which actors operate in the political environment and 
have access to structures of power.   
The party system in Latvia is divided along ethnic lines and there is ample 
research on how this cleavage functions and impacts Latvian politics as well as society 
(e.g. Ījabs, 2015; Nakai, 2014; Zepa et al., 2005). This division is not in place in the other 
two Baltic States, Estonia and Lithuania and in fact, this makes the Latvian party system 
peculiar among all the EU member states that formerly belonged to the socialist block. 
This situation leads to a unique political environment where political parties exploit ethnic 
tensions to gain popular support rather than social or economic issues as it is in the 
traditional right – left spectrum. In fact, left-wing is mainly understood as representing 
the Russian minority while centre and right wing political forces are the parties that are 
generally relying on ethnic Latvian electorate (Kažoka, 2010). This dichotomy comes 
with certain incompatible views attached to each political force: “The ethnolinguistic 
political borderline is clear-cut and is linked to the issues of support for Latvia’s 
independence and pro-Western orientation versus a pro-Russian orientation and 
dependency of Russia” (ibid, 2010, p. 86).  
Latvian political landscape is characterized by quite a large number of parties and 
certain volatility. Emergence of new parties, formation of party unions or splitting of 
existing parties are not unusual. Usually around 5-6 parties reach the 5% threshold and 
obtain seats in the parliament called Saeima which has 100 seats in total. In the last two 
elections in 2014 and 2011, six and five parties and party unions obtained seats in the 
parliament (12. Saiemas vēlēšanas, 2014; 2011. gada tautas, 2011). All except one of 
these parties have been mainly relying on ethnic Latvian electorate. Concerning ideology 
most of them are characterized as “catch-all parties” that do not fit the usual Western 
European standards of party ideologies (Kažoka, 2010). Issues of memory and history do 
not feature on their party programs explicitly. However, they mostly rely on ethnic-
national values. For example the party program of one of the largest parties after the last 
three parliamentary election Unity (Vienotība) reads:  “The basis of the Latvian state is a 
nation with a common understanding of its own history, respect for Latvian language and 
culture.”1 (Vienotība, n.d.)  
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 An exception is the National Alliance that quite clearly positions as national 
conservative. It is a union of the party For Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un brīvībai 
LNNK), which is a successor of the Latvian National Independence Movement, and a 
radical nationalist party All for Latvia (Visu Latvijai!).  The party is an active mnemonic 
warrior. For example its election manifesto for Riga municipal election in 2013 contains 
a promise that “[i]n Latvia and Riga everyone will honour Latvian cultural traditions, 
national symbols, and the commemoration of Latvian soldiers”†2 (“Nacionālā apvienība”, 
2013). In the original Latvian language version of the programme the world “Latvian” 
refers to the ethnicity rather than nationality and thus it also indicates opposition towards 
honouring other soldiers.  
The largest Russian minority party is Harmony (Saskaņa), previously Harmony 
Centre and People’s Harmony Party. As a party that is perceived as representing the ethnic 
Russian population and being pro-Russian, it has never been included in the ruling 
coalition despite being among the largest and most stable political forces in the 
parliament. This party has been active since 1998 and at the moment has the largest 
fraction in the Latvian parliament or Saeima with 24 MPs after Unity (Vienotība) with 
23. The more radical minority party Latvian Russian Union (Latvijas Krievu Savienība, 
Russian - Русский союз Латвии, until 2014 For Human Rights in United Latvia, known 
for its abbreviation in Latvian PCTVL or ЗаПЧЕЛ in Russian) has become more 
marginalized in the recent years and did not reach the 5% threshold in the last two 
parliamentary elections. Even though it is represented in the European Parliament by 
Tatjana Ždanoka, the party has lost most of its domestic electorate to Harmony. Ždanoka 
was an opponent of Latvian independence in 1990 and is now known for outspokenly 
criticizing minority rights in Latvia as well as a supporter of Soviet and contemporary 
Russian narratives on history. The party program of the Latvian Russian Union for the 
European Parliament elections in 2014 reads “We are against any expression of neo-
Nazism and revision of the results of World War II. The veterans of anti-Hitler coalition 
have to receive an official status and benefits”3 (“10. Saraksts”, 2014). Thus, it is also one 
of the few parties with an explicit reference to historical memory in its programme.  
                                                 
† All the quatations that are originally in Latvian or Russian are author’s translations. The original text is 
provided as endnotes  in Appendix I. 
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For the perpetual opposition party Harmony, history is one of the main points of 
disagreement with the “Latvian” political forces. Namely, the party leaders have not 
recognized Soviet occupation and discuss this part of history reluctantly, while some 
members of the party have outwardly denied it (“SC izvairās”, 2010; “Urbanovičs izdod”, 
2011). Nevertheless, Harmony’s rhetoric on questions of history and national minorities 
is much more subtle that that of Latvian Russian Union. Cheskin (2012) attributes it to 
top-down pressures that make the party adapt its interpretation of history and find “more 
conciliatory positions which find greater accord with the official memory-myths of the 
Latvia state” in order to be able to access political power in Latvia (p. 579).” In addition, 
Harmony has increasingly tried to position itself as a social democratic party outside 
ethnolinguistic categories. In contrast to the “Latvian” parties which see the Latvian state 
as founded on the Latvian nation and culture, Harmony stresses “equal participation in 
political, social and economic life of all people in Latvia” (Saskaņa, 2011).  
Despite the efforts to present Harmony as a social democratic party and occupy 
the vacant niche of the political left (Kažoka, 2010), its main electorate is still the Russian 
speaking community and those efforts saw a setback when Harmony supported a 
referendum for Russian as a second language in Latvia in 2012 which lead to a deepening 
of the ethnic cleavage both in Latvian society and party politics (Ījabs, 2015). Pettai 
(2016) points to the fact that Latvia is the only Baltic State with a where the ethnic 
minority is represented by a “viable” political party. In addition, even though Latvian 
Russian Union as a political force has seen a decline, the other two Baltic States do not 
feature a political actors that are so starkly countering the official state narratives on 20th 
century history and questioning legitimacy of state institutions (ibid.). The presence of 
radically opposite positions likely has impact also on the rest of the political actors and 
the positions they choose.  
According to Bernard and Kubik (2014) political actors take positions on salient 
memory issues when a particular stance can bring political benefits. This theory suggests 
that political forces in Latvia would use memory issues to increase political power, 
thinking that strong stance provided popular support. In line with this assumption, Zelče 
(2009) blames “low political culture” for exploiting conflicts over history (p. 54). In 
addition, Hanovs (2012) states that not only the radical political actors on both sides of 
the spectrum would portray certain memories as illegitimate or wrong but also the centrist 
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mainstream parties employ hierarchy of right and wrong individual and collective 
memories.   
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
This is a case study of Latvia, employing the theoretical model of Bernhard and Kubik 
(2014). In the next chapter I will use content analysis to examine the Latvian political 
environment to classify which types of mnemonic actors are present with regard to 
commemorative days that are especially important in the mnemonic field of Latvia.  
Arising from previous studies of memory politics in Latvia, the research questions 
of this study are:  
1. How is the diversity of mnemonic positions within both ethno-linguistic groups 
reflected in the political discourse?  How the memory regime within both ethnolinguistic 
groups is constituted?  
2. To what extent do interpretations of history exist that are common to both groups?  
I classify the types of mnemonic actors present in Latvian politics in line with 
Bernhard and Kubik’s model. The main characteristics of the three ideal types of actors - 
warrior, pluralist and abnegator - are described in table 3.1. Bernhard and Kubik 
characterize the actors based on Who, What, When, How, and Why questions. I categorize 
and analyse texts on the basis of the actor positions the text contains, applying the 
questions in table 3.1. In addition, I look if the position is represented among political 
actors who are considered to represent the ethnic majority or ones coming from parties 
that are backed mainly by Russian-speakers, i.e. Harmony or the Latvian Russian Union.  
 
Table 3.1: Types of mnemonic actors and their dominant strategies  
 
Questions 
 
Mnemonic warriors Mnemonic 
pluralists 
Mnemonic 
abnegators 
Who are the 
participants in 
memory politics? 
Us versus them. Us and them. Those who dwell on 
the past, not us. 
What is the 
predominant vision 
of collective 
memory? 
Memory is non-
negotiable, as there is 
only one “true” vision 
of the past. 
Negotiation on 
memory issues but 
within an agreement 
on the fundamentals 
of mnemonic 
politics. 
Low salience of 
memory issues for 
politics. 
  
29 
 
When are the events 
to be remembered 
happening? 
In a single mythical 
past (wrongs of the 
past are part of the 
tissue of present 
politics). 
(Probably) in 
multiple pasts. 
Different 
interpretations of the 
past exists. 
Never mind when; it 
is not important. 
There is no time like 
the present. 
How is the 
mnemonic contest 
to be carried out? 
What are the 
culturally 
prescribed 
strategies of action? 
Defeat, deny power 
to, delegitimize 
alternative version of 
the past. Do not 
negotiate, avoid 
compromise. 
Practice respect, 
toleration for 
alternative views of 
the past on the basis 
of a common 
understanding of the 
fundamentals. Be 
ready to negotiate or 
disagree. 
Avoid mnemonic 
contests. They are 
waste of time. 
Why is it 
worthwhile or not 
worthwhile to 
engage in 
mnemonic 
struggle? 
Fundamentalism: our 
“true” vision of the 
past legitimizes our 
claim to power. 
Pluralism: there are 
several visions of the 
past that are 
acceptable. Our 
claim to power rests 
on our effort to 
institutionalize a 
frame for their 
coexistence. 
 
Pragmatism: 
propagating a 
predominant vision 
of the past is not 
seen as worthwhile 
in comparison to 
responding to 
present-day 
problems. 
Note: From Bernhard and Kubik, 2014, p. 14  
 
I look at the mnemonic positions put forward by political actors in line with the 
definition of official memory put forward by Bernhard and Kubik. As formulation and 
propagation of official memory “involve the intensive participation of state institutions 
and/or political society (the authorities and major political actors such as parties, who are 
organized to hold and contest state power)” (Bernhard and Kubik, 2014, p. 16), these are 
the actors that I focus on. Particular attention is paid to political actors because they bring 
different narratives into the state institutions or exclude particular ways of remembrance. 
As Pettai (2016) points out, one of the weaknesses of the chapter by Eglitis and Ardava 
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(2014), which focuses on the Baltic States in Bernhard and Kubik’s book, is that instead 
of official discourse, the authors focus on intellectuals and other opinion leaders that are 
quoted in the media. Even though these people are important, they have a lesser role in 
shaping official memory. I, therefore, look at how different political actors in particular 
contribute to a specific memory regime that exists with regard to each of these mnemonic 
events. Political parties and their individual members as well as those holding high 
government offices are considered political actors for the purpose of this study in line 
with Bernhard and Kubik’s definition of official memory.  
In addition, anniversaries of specific events increase their salience in the political 
environment. They bring increased attention to commemorative events; therefore the 
commemorative days are more likely to be mentioned in public discourse, including 
speeches and commentaries delivered by political figures. Hence, significant 
commemorations of certain past events are chosen to determine the timeframe for data 
selection. This study looks at two commemorative days: May 9 - Victory Day that is 
widely celebrated by Latvian Russians together with May 8 - The Defeat of Nazism and 
Commemoration Day of Victims of World War II that is an official commemorative day 
in Latvia, and March 16 – an unofficial remembrance day of Latvian legionnaires. The 
commemorative days and anniversaries are listed in table 3.2 (see next page). These 
commemorative days embody the different interpretations of World War II among the 
Latvian majority and the Russian speaking minority; therefore they are good indicators 
of mnemonic divisions. Moreover, anniversaries of these historical dates were marked 
recently, either in 2014 or 2015. These are also highlighted as some of the most important 
memory events in the collective memory of Latvians and the Russophone community by 
Zelče (2009).  Similar findings are presented also by Kaprāns and Procevska (2013) and 
Kaprāns and Saulītis (2017). Moreover, as Eglitis and Ardava (2014) show analysing the 
remembrance of the national awakening, WWII memories are the deepest dimension of 
the conflict upon which other memories are layered.  
May 9 is an important “nodal point” for Latvian Russian speakers’ identity and 
March 16 is often seen as its ideological opposite (Cheskin, 2012). Even though the 
Legionnaires Day is a highly politicized commemoration that does not have as big popular 
support among Latvians and neither is alone a crucial element of Latvian national identity, 
attitudes towards it and the levels of acceptance of both commemorations are illustrative 
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of how pluralistic the mnemonic actors in Latvia are.  The people who support 9 May are 
most strictly against March 16 and the commemoration of Latvian legion is backed by 
people who are most antagonistic to Victory Day participants (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017).  
Table 3.2. Commemorative days  
Commemorative day Date Anniversary year 
Commemoration of Latvian 
Legionnaires 
March 16 70 years in 2014 
Victory Day/ The Defeat of Nazism and 
Commemoration Day of Victims of 
World War II 
May 9/May 8 70 years in 2015 
 
The data include speeches, commentaries and other statements made by political 
actors quoted in the media on the particular commemorative dates in 2014 and 2015.The 
criteria for data selection were timeframe and whether the actors is in a position to shape 
influence official memory in line with the definition by Bernhard and Kubik. The 
timeframe is the whole year of the anniversary even though most texts have been 
published within the scope of a month before and after the specific date. The actors 
include political parties and their leaders, members of the government, government 
bodies, the president, and deputies of the parliament. The data was coded in line with the 
type of mnemonic actor that the statements represent – warrior, pluralist or abnegator. In 
addition I take into account the ethnic group belonging of the political actor. 
The data is sourced from the database of periodicals in Latvia news.lv which 
contains over 100 different media sources, the biggest online news portals delfi.lv, 
tvnet.lv that provide news both in Latvian and Russian, the Russian language portal 
vesti.lv and the Latvian public broadcasting website lsm.lv. I searched the database and 
these websites using keywords May 9, Victory Day, Commemoration, Victims of WWII, 
March 16, and Legionnaires Day in both Latvian and Russian. If these sources referred 
to other outlets, I also looked up the referenced interviews, commentaries, TV or radio 
broadcasts, protocols of parliamentary meetings and other sources. In addition to media 
sources, news and minutes of parliamentary meetings published on the website of the 
Latvian parliament and in the official state periodical “Latvijas Vēstnesis” and its internet 
portal lvportals.lv are used as well as information available on the webpages of political 
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parties. Some speeches that are available online either in the form of a written record or 
a video are also included in the data. In total 30 texts that concern the commemoration of 
the end of WWII and 22 texts on March 16 were included in the analysis. Most of the 
texts are in Latvian. Eleven texts in Russian were included in the sample. I mainly looked 
at media publications but the data also includes four full speeches, four official 
government documents and publications from four websites of political parties.  
There are some limitations to the data. Firstly, news items in the media use quotes 
selectively; therefore they might not fully reflect an actor’s position. For this reason, full 
speeches were included in the sample when available. If the quotes were sourced from a 
TV or radio interview or debate, the full broadcast was reviewed. Secondly, important 
limitation of the data is that only party leaders and highest officials are the most likely to 
be quoted by the media. Also, warriors presenting confrontational positions are more 
likely to obtain media coverage.  For this reason, I tried to include a variety of actors in 
the sample. Moreover, Latvian Russian speakers rely not only on the Latvian but also the 
Russian media space. Therefore, it is more difficult to draw a line where the domestic 
mnemonic field ends. At the same time, looking at official memory in Latvia, stipulates 
that the subjects of analysis are political actors that have access to political power in 
Latvia. Therefore, analysing external positions is outside of the scope of this study; 
however, it is important to keep in mind that top-down narratives that influence the 
mnemonic field in Latvia, can come also from outside. 
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4. ANALYSIS OF WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIONS   
4.1. March 16: the unofficial commemoration of the Latvian Legion  
4.1.1. Origin of the March 16 commemoration and its place in collective memory  
March 16 is an unofficial day of remembrance of the Volunteer Latvian SS legion. Up to 
this day the legion is one of the most contested issues in Latvian history. It was a 
formation of Latvian soldiers that was formed in the Nazi occupied Latvian territory. 
Latvian historians have concluded that it mainly consisted of conscripted soldiers and that 
the legion as such was not involved in Nazi war crimes (Neiburgs, 2011). However, 
controversies around the March 16 commemorative events remain strong as the day has 
been highly politicized and has also drawn international attention and condemnation from 
Russia for glorifying Nazism. The most controversial event of March 16 is a procession 
of the veterans of the legion towards the Freedom Monument in Riga.  
Commemoration of the Legion on March 16 was started soon after WWII by the 
Latvian exile organization Daugavas Vanagi. March 16 was chosen because in 1944 on 
this date the two divisions of the Latvian legion for the first and only time participated in 
a battle together. The exile institutions created and kept alive a “heroic myth” about the 
Latvian legion making them politically and emotionally significant symbols of history 
(Zelče, 2011a, p, 111). The main component of this myth was the idea that despite fighting 
under the Nazi Germany, legionnaires were fighting for a free Latvia and their fight 
against the Red Army was morally justifiable on the grounds of the repressions that the 
Soviet rule carried out in Latvia during the occupation from 1940 until 1941. After 
restoration of Latvia’s independence this myth of legionnaires as freedom fighters 
became an important part of the re-emerging Latvian collective memory together with 
other memories that were outlawed during the Soviet occupation. Zelče (2011a) argues 
that is was a way for Latvians to fill the lack of heroes that resulted from the fact that 
Latvia did not show armed resistance to the Soviet occupation in 1940. At the same time, 
repressions were the core feature of Latvian identity and also the legionnaires theme was 
dominated by victim discourse.  
The heroic myth about legionnaires was already used by political forces in the 
1990s and soon also disclosed mnemonic confrontations. In mid-90s the annual 
procession towards the freedom monument started to take place. The narrative of heroism 
of the legionnaires as freedom fighters was used by national conservative political actors 
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to mobilize voters on the basis of patriotism. First mnemonic confrontations occurred in 
1998 with condemnation of the procession by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
condemnation created resistance and in 1998 March 16 was included among the official 
commemorative days and the Latvian parliament took a decision on “Declaration on 
Latvian legionnaires during World War II” (“Deklarācija”, 1998).  
The main positions, nonetheless, changed again as Latvia prepared to join the 
European Union and NATO and had to ally its national memory with how history is seen 
in Western Europe - inclusion of the Holocaust and condemnation of Nazi war crimes. 
This led to a broader acknowledgement that the myth of legionnaires-freedom fighters is 
inaccurate and problematic on the international stage. The new narrative recognized that 
Latvians were fighting on both sides during WWII and reinforced the simultaneous 
condemnation of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as two evils (Zelče, 2011). 
Consequently March 16 was also removed from the list of official commemorations in 
2000 and public officials have distanced themselves from the March 16 commemorative 
events, especially the march held in Riga. The official Latvian state position has been to 
commemorate the legionnaires on November 11 as a common commemorative day for 
all Latvian soldiers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).  In 2011 deputies of Saeima from 
the National Alliance sought to reintroduce the day in the calendar of official 
commemorations but their proposal was convincingly rejected (“Saeima noraida”, 2011). 
Lately, the number of people at the events is slightly growing but popular support in 
general is decreasing (Kaprāns and Procevska, 2013; Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017). Also, in 
the political rhetoric March 16 is more and more abnegated. The following analysis of 
official memory regime on March 16 in 2014, nonetheless, reveals that the mainstream 
political elites face difficulties in responding to mnemonic warriors from more radical 
political parties.  
4.1.2. March 16 in 2014  
In 2014 two new factors influenced how March 16 was dealt with in official memory. 
Those were international and European pressures to ally Latvian national memory with 
the west and the crisis in Ukraine that awakened insecurity among many Latvians. As 
every year the date was marked with a commemorative service in the Riga Dome Church 
and a procession towards the Freedom Monument that was accompanied by an anti-
fascism demonstration (Bērtule, Čunka, & Rozenberga, 2014). The central controversy 
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of March 16 in 2014 was the dismissal of the Minister of Environmental Protection and 
Regional development Einārs Cilinskis from the government position after he resolved to 
participate in the procession from the old town to the Freedom Monument in Riga. 
In 2014 Prime Minister (PM) Laimdota Straujuma suggested all the members of 
her government not to participate in the procession honouring the legionnaires. Latvian 
politicians had in mind the upcoming presidency in the Council of the European Union 
that the country assumed in the first half of 2015.  Because political elites wanted to show 
Latvia as a fully European country, controversies over March 16 were undesirable. 
Moreover, due to the situation in Ukraine (the referendum in Crimea took place on the 
same day), security alerts on provocations on behalf of Russia were higher than in other 
years and security services invited not to participate in the events (“Kažociņš: Šogad”, 
2014). Straujuma on a TV interview expressed that regarding the commemorative 
procession at the Freedom Monument, the government “has to take into account the 
reaction of [its] allies – EU countries on the possibility that the government might be 
supporting Nazism or fascism which Europe takes very painfully”4 (“16. marts rada”, 
2014). All coalition parties apart from the National Alliance supported this position 
without commenting it, thus taking an abnegator stance. In a letter addressing the coalition 
parties, Straujuma stated that the Latvian inhabitants were mobilized in the occupying 
Nazi and Soviet militaries using “inhumane repressions and continuous terror”5 and 
against international law (“Straujuma brīdina”, 2014). She also expressed respect towards 
the fallen soldiers and invited to commemorate them on November 11 or at the memorial 
in Lestene – a cemetery of the fallen legionnaires:   
We - the representatives of government and coalition parties are Latvian patriots 
and we respect the fallen soldiers. In Latvia the remembrance day of soldiers is 
November 11, not March 16. For this reason everyone who wants to show respect 
to the fallen soldiers on March 16 can visit Lestene Brothers’ cemetery, in this 
way not subjecting Latvia to unnecessary threat of provocations.6 (ibid.)  
The former PM Valdis Dombrovskis expressed a similar stance stating that the annual 
march “has turned into and event where radicals of both sides seek confrontation with 
each other” and participation of government ministers in the procession would be 
understood “neither in the west, nor in the east”7 (“Ekspremjers: Ministriem”, 2014). This 
abnegator position based solely on concern of Latvia’s image internationally, however, 
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was used to make the government politicians appear weak and was challenged by both - 
nationalists who supported the event and those in opposition who claimed that the march 
glorifies Nazism.  
The minister of Environmental Protection and Regional Protection Einārs 
Cilinskis resisted government’s decision and took part in the march in Riga. As a result 
Cilinskis, who is a member of the National Alliance, was dismissed from his ministerial 
position (“Straujuma brīdina”, 2016). Defending his choice, Cilinskis argued that “[t]he 
meaning of March 16 procession is not only to clearly condemn two totalitarian regimes 
of the past that have brought enormous destruction to Latvia and the world, but also to 
address the rebirth of fascism today”8 (Cilinskis, 2014). He connected the event to the 
war in Ukraine. In an interview he stated: “This year March 16 for sure will not be merely 
a date on which we commemorate those who fell for Latvia. It will be a protest against 
the aggressor Russia, and this means that the need to participate in March 16 events is 
greater than in other years.”9 (Ozoliņa, 2014) Cilinskis also promised to lay flowers in the 
colours of the Ukrainian flag at the Freedom Monument drawing parallels between 
annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Baltics in 1940 as well as the legionnaires 
– fighters for Latvian freedom and Ukrainians who have been victims of present Russian 
aggression (Cilinskis, 2014.). Rejection of March 16 was interpreted as concession to 
Russian aggression and even treason of Latvian heroes.  
Other members of the National Alliance also expressed a sense that the prohibition 
of government ministers to participate in the procession show disrespect to “Latvian 
soldiers” and that the Prime Minister has imposed it because of a lack of political will to 
resist external pressures. For example, leader of National Alliance Raivis Dzintars argued 
that “[i]nstead of having diplomats explain the whole world the history of Latvian Legion, 
the state has indirectly surrendered to Russian propaganda”10 (“Straujuma brīdina”, 
2014). Others like the Deputy of the Riga City Council and historian Ritvars Jansons also 
drew on the legionnaire – freedom fighter myth:  
The fighters against the occupying powers during the Nazi and Stalinist times 
maintained the idea of independence. They also passed on this idea to next 
generations. Without this process we would have no [National] Awakening the 
way we had it and perhaps we would not have a restored Republic of Latvia but a 
country that had separated from the USSR.11 (Jansons, 2014)  
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In addition, in the nationalist rhetoric March 16 is often contrasted to May 9. For example, 
National Alliance’s member of Saeima Edvīns Šņore called the government’s decision 
“embarrassing’ and “a hysteric action against March 16 that contrasts so much to the 
silence of the responsible public officials before May 9 that sometimes make one think 
that they are dealing with the local authority of the Latvian USSR rather than the 
government of independent Latvia” (Šņore, 2014). Šņore also links the situation to 
Ukraine crisis stating that “in Ukraine there was no March 16, nor ‘humiliating’ 
naturalization exams, nor non-citizens and Russia found a reason to send there its troops. 
Moreover, chanting the same as usual – fight against fascism”12 (ibid.). Thus, the 
nationalists found Ukraine crisis to be a reason to support March 16 as a protest against 
present Russian aggression. The members of the parliament (MPs) of the National 
Alliance also linked the Ukraine crisis to March 16 and questions of historical justice in 
the plenary debate of Saeima after the annular report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the Parliament (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2015). 
 All in all, the party’s discourse on March 16 shows that the National Alliance has 
internalized March 16 as a symbol of Latvian nationalism. As a typical mnemonic 
warrior, the party uses it to position itself as the defender of the “true” history. Its webpage 
contains a section on March 16 stating:  
Succumbing to the pressure of Russia and its fifth column, the Saeima removed 
March 16 from the list of official observances; at the same time repressions and a 
campaign for ‘discrediting Latvia’s international reputation’ were directed against 
military and public officials who dared to participate in a commemorative march 
together with the legionnaires at the Freedom Monument.13 (National Alliance, 
n.d.)  
Also, public debates show that March 16 has become a political tool for the National 
Alliance to position themselves as the only bearers of truth while other political actors 
surrender to external pressures.  
 On the other end of Latvian political spectrum there were warrior statements 
condemning the Legionnaire Day. Yet, those were fewer and more marginal, mainly 
coming from separate civil society organizations and individuals. On the political level, 
the leader of the Latvian Russian Union Tatjana Ždanoka in a TV debate after election to 
the European Parliament asserted: “Our fathers fought against Nazism but now those who 
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were collaborationists call heroes. It creates cleavage in society. Revision of history now 
happens everywhere and it is dangerous to society.”14 (“Izvēlies nākotni!”, 2014) One of 
the demonstrations against “glorification of Nazism” that happened on March 16 in Riga 
was organized by Elizabete Krivcova who was Harmony’s candidate in the European 
Parliament elections 2014 and is also one of the founders of the Congress of Non-Citizens 
which is an organization that claims to defend the rights of Russians in Latvia.  
However, within the more moderate Harmony there was no unified position on 
March 16 events. Public statements of its leaders on either the commemorative events or 
the choice of Cilinskis shortly before or after March 16 in 2014 are difficult to find. This 
implies that most of Harmony’s politicians took an abnegator stance and did not want to 
engage in mnemonic conflicts. However, the party also featured some clear mnemonic 
warriors. Besides the already mentioned Krivcova, member of Saeima Irina Cvetkova 
gave an interview to a Russia-based outlet arguing that March 16 events in Latvia 
demonstrate “glorification of Waffen SS legionnaires who are celebrated as fighters for 
Latvian independence even though it is commonly known that they gave an oath to Adolf 
Hitler and fought for the Third Reich rather than the independence of Latvia”15 
(Fyodorova, 2014). Cvetkova had already received a penalty according to Code of Ethics 
of Saeima for her earlier remarks about the “reality of revival of Nazism” in the restored 
Republic of Latvia (Rekeda, 2013; Delna, 2014). Later in 2014 Cvetkova left Harmony 
and joined the Latvian Russian Union claiming that she has “a continuous conflict with 
party’s leadership because it has given up its own ideology […] by for example not 
condemning the legionnaire march on March 16 and turning  May 9 celebration into a 
political agitation show with no ideological content”16 (“Saiemas deputāte Cvetkova”, 
2014).  
The most prominent leader of Harmony, Mayor of Riga Nils Ušakovs, in contrast, 
took an abnegator stance stating in an interview to a Russian news outlet Meduza that 
“[i]t is easier for politicians to talk about a threat from Moscow or the rebirth of fascism 
than about social issues”17 (Azar, 2014). Nonetheless, in the same interview he voiced 
rather pluralistic positions highlighting that “Latvian citizens were not mobilized [in the 
legion] on the basis of ethnicity, but on the basis of passport. From Latgale, a lot of 
Russian and Russian speakers were conscripted.”18 He also acknowledged that under the 
Soviet rule “terrible repressions” were carried out against the population of Latvia and 
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the majority of legionnaires were mobilized and “could choose between the Legion and 
the concentration camp”19, thus assigning them a victim role in history:  
Moreover, more than a million citizens of the Soviet Union fought on the side of 
the Germans. My mother is from Krasnodar, and there a unit of 250,000 people 
was formed from the Cossacks, who fought on the side of the Germans. This is 
more than Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians combined. Therefore, everything 
is complicated. Practically for everyone in Latvia someone of their relatives has 
been in the legion. This is part of family memory. But to use people who became 
victims of history, in modern politics, to earn some points, is unacceptable.20 
(ibid.) 
His remarks present an attempt not to look at the history exclusively through ethnic 
categories and take a pluralist stance. However, these opinions are only expressed in a 
single interview for an outlet that does not target the domestic audience in Latvia.  
 Another trend towards greater pluralism is the emergence of Lestene as an 
alternative and a less controversial location for March 16 commemorative events. Even 
though also these events are attended by political actors, mainly from the National 
Alliance, they have not drawn equal publicity and are mainly attended by the war veterans 
and their relatives who often themselves do not support the march taking place in Riga. 
This is illustrated by the news title quoting one of the participants “People in Lestene 
commemorate legionnaires at their resting place without pompous processions” (“Lestenē 
cilvēki”, 2014). Also public surveys show that the Lestene memorial enjoys much greater 
acceptance among both ethnic groups (Kaprāns and Saulītis, 2017).  
In sum, regarding March 16 the memory regime is fractured and there are radical 
mnemonic warriors on both sides. Among the Latvian mainstream political parties, 
abnegator position dominates. The warriors are marginalized but taking an abnegator 
position, the mainstream political leaders also risk providing space for more radical 
powers to voice their positions. Without providing any substantive explanation why 
March 16 should not be marked they have allowed the national-conservative discourse to 
dominate. The National Alliance is clearly employing Legionnaires Day in its political 
rhetoric in order to show its opponents as weak and unable to defend national history. 
Among the parties representing the Russophone population, Latvian Russian Union takes 
a clear warrior position while in Harmony there are both warriors and abnegators. 
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However no political actor representing the Russian speakers would evaluate March 16 
positively. Therefore, the conclusion is that the memory regime on March 16 is fractured 
on both sides of the ethnic-political division. The only common point is the abnegator 
position and the condemnation of politicizing remembrance. The positions are outlined 
in table 4.1.  
Table 4.1. Mnemonic positions concerning March 16   
Questions Warriors I: 
Legionnaire 
hero myth  
Warriors II: 
Legionnaires 
day – revision 
of history  
Pluralists:  
Everyone has 
the right to 
commemorate 
Abnegators:  
Discussing 
March 16 is 
unfruitful  
Who are the 
participants in 
memory 
politics?  
We who defend 
national heroes 
against them who 
want to erase 
them from 
history.  
We who believe 
Nazism was the 
biggest tragedy 
in history and 
commemorate 
the ones who 
fought against it 
against them 
who want to 
revise history.   
All of us who 
understand that 
WWII history 
was complicated 
and victims and 
perpetrators are 
to be found on 
both sides, 
among all 
ethnicities.  
Those political 
actors who 
exploit memory 
battles for 
political 
manipulations.  
What is the 
predominant 
vision of 
collective 
memory?  
Legionnaires 
were Latvian 
heroes because 
they fought 
against the 
Soviet Union and 
for a free Latvia.  
Legionnaires 
fought on the 
side of Nazi 
Germany which 
is not justifiable 
on any grounds.  
The history of 
Latvian legion is 
complex and 
mainly can be 
viewed to the 
prism of 
individual 
experiences. 
Marking and 
discussing 
Legionnaires 
day only 
complicates 
Latvian political 
and security 
situation.  
When are the 
events to be 
remembered 
happening? 
The events are 
transferred to the 
present – 
defending 
national heroes is 
important  
Victory over 
Nazism is a 
reference point 
for history and 
the basis of 
present Europe.  
Latvians and 
Russian speakers 
as well as 
Western Europe 
each have their 
own 
interpretation of 
past.  
Never mind 
when; Latvia 
needs to focus 
on its present 
political, 
economic and 
security issues.   
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How is the 
mnemonic 
contest to be 
carried out? 
What are the 
culturally 
prescribed 
strategies of 
action?  
We must tell the 
world the truth 
about the Latvian 
legion. 
Compromises 
and concessions 
are betrayal of 
our national 
values.   
Legionnaire day 
is a form of 
celebration of 
Nazism; 
therefore it 
requires 
outspoken 
condemnation 
and 
international 
attention.  
We have to 
acknowledge the 
crimes of 
Nazism and 
communism but 
everyone has the 
right to their 
opinion and the 
right to 
commemorate 
the fallen 
soldiers.  
Memory should 
not be 
politicized and 
political actors 
should not take 
part in disputes 
over March 16.   
Why is it 
worthwhile or 
not 
worthwhile to 
engage in 
mnemonic 
struggle?  
Forgetting the 
heroes and the 
tragic history of 
WWII will 
provide space for 
Russian 
aggression and 
may lead to the 
history to repeat.  
The mnemonic 
struggle is 
connected to the 
rights of 
Russians in 
Latvia.  
The memory 
conflict has to be 
settled to avoid 
escalation and 
possibility of 
manipulation 
with history.   
It is not 
worthwhile. 
Engaging in 
memory politics 
will just attract 
unwanted 
attention.   
Which political 
actors voice the 
position?  
Only actors 
representing 
ethnic Latvians.  
Only actors 
representing 
Russian 
speakers.  
Elements of this 
narrative can be 
found in among 
both politicians 
representing 
both 
ethnolinguistic 
groups.   
Elements of this 
narrative can be 
found in among 
both politicians 
representing 
both 
ethnolinguistic 
groups.   
Note: Adapted From Bernhard and Kubik, 2014, p. 14  
 
4.2. Remembering the end of World War II  
4.2.1. When and how is the end of World War II remembered in Latvia?  
The root of the controversy between May 8 and May 9 is the date and time when the 
capitulation act of Germany was signed. Because of time difference, in Western Europe 
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it happened on May 8 while in the Soviet Union it was already the day after. This 
historical detail in Latvia has been amplified by radically different interpretations of this 
day. Inheriting the ritual from the USSR, in Russia and also among many Russians in the 
former Soviet countries May 9 is marked as a victorious mass celebration. At the same 
time, the Latvian understanding of May 8 is based on victim identity and mourning while 
commemorative events are formal and mainly involve only the political elite.  
Collective memory of the majority of Russian speakers in Latvia is informed by 
the Soviet and contemporary Russian official historiography. This vision is built around 
heroism of the Red Army that was crucial in the defeat of Nazism and the suffering that 
was borne by the Soviet and Russian people (Cheskin, 2012). Thus, Victory Day has an 
exclusively positive meaning in the Russian collective memory and it is a source of 
positive self-identification (Ločmele, Procevska & Zelče, 2011). In contrast, for Latvians 
end of the war also marked start of sovietisation, mass repressions, activity of national 
partisans and lost independence (Zellis, 2011). As consequence, May 8/9 is a particularly 
salient commemorative day that represents the starkest conflict between the narrative of 
liberation and the Latvian official narrative on occupation and suffering under two equally 
brutal dictatorships. In contrast to the 16 March commemoration of Latvian legionnaires 
that is being increasingly abnegated by the political elites, the Victory Day celebration 
remains important for the Russian minority and is even gaining more public support in 
the latest years (Kaprāns & Procevska, 2013).  
Ločemele, Procevska and Zelče (2011) have observed that the change in how 
Victory Day is marked among Latvian Russian-speakers is analogue to evolution of May 
9 in Russia. From rather quiet celebration focusing on war veterans in the 1990s, since 
2000 the day has become a form of political entertainment and expression of the solidarity 
of the Russian speaking community with the past taking an increasingly mythical form. 
They highlight that the May 9 events and places like the Victory Monument in Riga have 
become sites of institutionalization of Russian minority’s political activity and resistance 
against state policy. Victory day has been increasingly linked to political issues that are 
salient for Latvian Russian speakers such as rights of Russian speakers, citizenship and 
the language of instruction in minority schools (Ločemele, Procevska & Zelče, 2011). In 
what follows I look at how May 8 and May 9 have been framed in Latvian public 
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discourse and by political actors in particular during 70th anniversary of the end of WWII 
in 2015.  
Officially since 1995 May 8 in Latvia is The Crushing of Nazism and 
Commemorative Day of Victims of World War II while May 9 is not a formally 
recognized observance. The homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia 
informs about this date, stating:  
For Latvia and the Latvians, World War II was a time of great suffering. Both 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union violated international law by mobilizing the 
population of Latvia into their armed forces. About 200 000 Latvian soldiers 
served in the forces of both occupying states, and about half of them (100 000) 
were killed in battle. (“Latvia’s National”, 2016) 
As an infographic of the State Chancellery of Latvia shows, May 8 is, thus, a 
commemoration day of the victims of WWII that is marked in Latvia on the same day as 
in the rest of Europe, while May 9 is celebrated as European Day (“Ko pasaulē atzīmē”, 
2015).   
 
4.2.2. Commemorations on May 8 and May 9 in 2015 
In 2015 several events took place to commemorate the end of WWII on both May 8 and 
May 9. However, only May 8 events were truly official in a sense that the highest public 
officials were present and state authorities organized or officially recognized the events.  
May 9 events, in contrast, were not attended by state officials but several political actors, 
nevertheless, did take part. The most important commemorative events on May 8 in 2015 
were commemorative ceremonies in Riga Brothers’ cemetery, Salaspils Memorial – the 
former location of a Nazi concentration camp and Brothers’ cemetery of Lestene – the 
burial site and memorial for soldiers who fought in the Latvian Legion (“Otrā pasaules 
kara”, 2015). On May 9 there were events in both Riga and other cities but the most 
notable and widely attended was the annual event at the Victory Monument in Riga 
(ibid.).  
 During the May 8 events Latvian state officials made various statements that 
ranged from warrior to abnegator to pluralist. By constructing May 8 as a neutral 
commemoration day, the political elite was taking an abnegator stance on the memory 
conflicts that are related to WWII. A rather pluralistic position was voiced by President 
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Andris Bērziņš who already in 2012 invited to remember the victims of WWII on May 8 
as “a suitable day for all war veterans to gather in a single commemorative event and 
together remember all the victims of Nazism and communism during the WWII” 21  
(“Otrdien, 8. maijā”, 2012). He also urged “…remembering the end of Second World War 
and commemorating its victims, to thank people who fought for this victory [over 
Nazism] and an opportunity to open a new page in world history”22 (ibid.). In addition 
Bērziņš started a tradition for the highest state officials to attend the commemoration in 
Salaspils memorial as well as invited war veterans of both sides to meet at the 
commemorative event in Riga Brothers’ cemetery on May 8. Earlier the veteran 
organization of the 130th Latvian riflemen corps (a formation of mainly ethnic Latvian 
soldiers within the Red Army) held their own, completely separate commemorative event 
in the Riga Brothers’ cemetery just before the arrival of the highest public officials and 
the two events never coincided (Ločemele, Procevska & Zelče, 2011). In 2015 around 
200 people had gathered at the commemoration and according to the media report war 
veterans had pinned medals and orders to their clothes, ribbons of Saint George but others 
– little Latvian flags thus showing that people holding different opinion have united in 
the commemoration (“Piemiņas pasākumā”, 2015).  
At the same time Bērziņš expressed expectations that marking 8th and 9th of May 
separately is a transition period that will change (“Bērziņš: 8. un 9. maija”, 2012). In 2015 
Bērziņš attempted to separate individual memories and individual participants of war 
from the deeds of totalitarian regimes, stating “[i]n the special situation of Latvia we have 
many soldiers who were forced to fight on both sides or a brother had to fight against a 
brother”23 (“Prezidents: Brauciens”, 2015). He also emphasises that the question on the 
outcome of WWII in Latvia is “more complicated than in any other place because Latvia 
suffered from both of the big powers”24 (ibid., 2015). The emphasis on Latvia’s unique 
situation during and after the war is also expressed by other actors. Prime Minister 
Laimdota Straujuma stated in a speech in Salaspils memorial: “The war was a horror 
caused by totalitarian power and afterwards Latvia was unfree for long years. We 
condemn these totalitarian regimes – the Nazi as well as Soviet totalitarianism. And that 
we need to remember.”25 (“Latvijā piemin kara”, 2015)  
However, not all highest public officials chose the same approach. While the 
President and Prime Minister of Latvia acknowledged the suffering that occurred under 
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both totalitarian regimes and on both sides, the speaker of Saeima Ināra Mūrniece, 
member of the National Alliance, put a different emphasis and took a warrior stance, 
focusing exclusively on Latvian suffering under the Soviet occupation. She also chose to 
connect the memory of restoration of independence on May 4 in 1990 to the 
commemoration of 70 years since end of WWII, stating:  
25 years ago we experienced an essential victory of justice over injustice and the 
resurrection of truth with the decision of the Supreme Council on the restoration 
of the Republic of Latvia that was forcibly interrupted by the Soviet occupation. 
And not every nation is able to restore a once lost country on the foundations that 
are as strong. Independence of Latvia was restored on the values of the Republic 
of November 18, 1918 – Latvian language, Latvian culture, love for our own land, 
people and own country. And Latvian people maintain the eternal values in the 
hardest circumstances. It is testified by our breaking away from the half-century 
long oppression and stagnation.26 (“Ināra Mūrniece apmeklē”, 2015)  
These statements were made during a speech at the Lestene memorial and only 
acknowledges the Soviet occupation. Quite peculiar is the fact that considering the site of 
the speech – a memorial of soldiers who fought in the Latvian legion – there is no mention 
of the Nazi occupation. The second part of the speech referring to the foundations of the 
Latvian state also quite clearly excludes the part of Latvia’s population of other 
ethnicities.  
Regarding May 9 most Latvian political actors take an abnegator stance. A few 
remarks more pluralistic remarks express that everyone can mark either date on individual 
level and that war veterans and their relatives need to be paid due respect. Prime Minister 
Straujuma invited people to “tolerant and compassionate”, attributing the memory 
conflicts over May 9 to “extremists” and recognizing different commemoration rituals:  
There are groups of extremists who always want to create provocations on May 9. 
On these dates [March] 16 and May 9, there are different groups of population 
and different emphases. Russian speakers historically mark Russian people’s 
victory over fascism but for Latvia it is the beginning of occupation.27 (“Straujuma 
9. maijā aicina”, 2015)  
The wording of this comment is considerably accommodating of the Russian speaker 
narrative on Victory Day, allowing the two positions to co-exist. However, the tone and 
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wording of these remarks were not convincing and neither did the Prime Minister of the 
president engage in a discussion of history that would characterize mnemonic pluralists.  
Representatives of National Alliance, in contrast, have been keen mnemonic 
warriors. Those political actors who express more pluralistic views or take abnegator 
stance have often been “attacked” by mnemonic warriors who feel that history is 
misrepresented. One of the central points of conflict is that these actors feel that 
recognizing the victims of both sides, the suffering of Latvians is neglected or not 
sufficiently acknowledged. As presented in the previous chapter, this was manifested by 
claims for official recognition of 16 March. Tolerance towards the Victory Day, invoked 
a comparison to March 16. For example, reacting to the statements of the Prime Minister, 
MP Edvīns Šņore, who is a historian and a film director, and one of the most outspoken 
MPs regarding 20th century history, expressed in an interview: “Of course in a coalition 
you have to search political compromises but there are things that are hard to accept. I 
personally cannot accept Unity’s position on March 16. Call of the head of government 
Laimdota Straujuma on May 9 to be tolerant and compassionate is in stark contrast to 
what she usually says before March 16.”28 (Antonevičs, 2015) Šņore has expressed a 
strong warrior position in the previous years as well:  
Those [people going to the Victory monument in Riga on May 9] are people who 
have something to be grateful for to the USSR occupation. Without it they would 
not be here. May 9 in Latvia celebrates the occupant army that has only a 
decorative link to remembrance of the dead. The real essence of May 9 is a 
celebration of Russian imperial might with the invincible army – liberator as the 
central element. If it is understandable in Moscow, then in Riga it is a defiant 
demonstration of disrespect to this once occupied country and its indigenous 
population.29 (Šņore, 2014)   
His position delegitimizes both the Victory Day celebration and the people who perform 
it portraying them as belonging to Russia or the past of Soviet occupation with no place 
in present day Latvia.  
Consolidation of a warrior position is also observable in the rhetoric of the 
Minister of Culture Dace Melbārde, another member of the National Alliance. She 
expressed her surprise that besides “the generation that immigrated to Latvia with 
concrete goals during the Soviet times” also young people come to the Victory monument 
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in Riga. She further poses a question of “what are these youth taught about the history 
and symbols if Latvia”30 (“Melbārde: Jauniešu”, 2015). She expresses hope that the young 
Russian speakers can be “taught” to identify with the Latvian state that was proclaimed 
in 1918 and restored in 1990. These statements present the two ways of remembering as 
mutually exclusive. Hence, any form of coexistence of two different memories, whereby 
people who celebrate May 9 as Victory Day could also celebrate Latvian national 
holidays, is perceived as impossible. They also show the positon held by Latvians that 
Victory Day belongs to the past.  
The perceived incompatibility is also shown in that Victory Day is presented as 
the ideological opposite to European day. For example, the internet portal of the official 
periodical of the Latvian government features a commentary on May 9 by a historian 
Vilnis Purēns (2015) states: “On Europe Day - May 9 the founding of the European Union 
is marked as a symbol of a Europe that is new, peaceful and focused on society. In our 
region a part of society turns the tragedy of the Second World War into an impressive 
propaganda show.”31 Similar publication was featured in the official periodical also in the 
following year titled “Shuman versus Stalin”. The text reads: “…Victory Day in its 
present form is the central celebration of the political views of Putin’s Russia, sometimes 
called Putinism. In the first place this celebration is for anyone who is dissatisfied and 
disappointed in the liberal west.”32 (Sils, 2016) Victory Day in this text represents 
Latvia’s past in the Soviet Union (as well as threat from present Russia) while European 
Day represents Latvia’s present and future – returning back to its place in Europe. These 
two days are framed as a mutually exclusive dichotomy whereby the Victory Day 
celebration and often also the people celebrating it are seen as a threat to Latvia’s freedom 
and its identity.  Indeed, also in the official discourse on May 8, many political actors 
emphasise Latvia’s place in Europe especially against the backdrop of the perception of 
external threat from Russia that has increased with the beginning of the conflict in 
Ukraine. For example, Ināra Mūrniece proclaimed that “today when the threat of hybrid 
warfare is openly discussed in Europe, Latvia need to clearly acknowledge its western 
orientation”33 (“Saeimas Priekšsēdētāja”, 2015). Thus, the need to be a part of Europe 
and to secure Latvia’s identity as a European country finds a strengthened expression in 
the context of the Ukraine crisis.  
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The conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea was a significant external 
factor that shaped the mnemonic narratives in 2014 and 2015. It has played a role in 
Latvian memory politics by invoking a fear of the past that could repeat (Wezel, 2016). 
On the one hand, political actors saw a threat of escalating the mnemonic conflict between 
Latvians and Russian speakers which lead to more actors taking pluralist and abnegator 
stances. Similarly as on March 16, political actors adopted more cautious positions also 
because Latvia assumed its presidency in the Council of the European Union in 2015 and 
memory conflicts could show the country in a negative light. For instance, the 
Citizenship, Committee of the Saeima on Migration and Social Cohesion issued a call to 
avoid provocations on March 16 and May 9. The committee called people to be 
responsible and tolerant to different ways of remembering the victims of WWII:  
Let us pay respect to the war veterans and the relatives of the fallen who want to 
join the veterans and commemorate their close ones. Let us remember the horrible 
circumstances in which the soldiers were separated from their families, injured, 
maimed or killed. We invite to remember the fallen, not to judge them. They did 
not start the war and they are not continuing it at present! We invite others not to 
continue this war too and not to use its consequences for selfish and provocative 
purposes.34 (Saeima, 2015) 
Importantly the call reads: “Inviting to choose May 8 as a common day for 
commemoration of the victims of World War II, we respect the wish of the veterans to 
commemorate their fallen fellow soldiers on either March 16 or May 9.”35 It also refers 
to strengthening “peace in Latvia with dignified commemorations of the victims of World 
War II regardless of where, when and on which side they were fighting and where and 
when we are remembering them in Latvia.”36 Similarly to the statements by Bērziņš and 
Straujuma, this text expresses a pluralist positions and disconnects individual participants 
of the commemorations from memory and history conflicts and the current politics. On 
the other hand, the more nationalistic political forces saw expansion of ‘Russian 
imperialism’ in the May 9 events that are threatening to rewrite the history. Hence, they 
found the events in Ukraine to be a reason for taking an even more radical warrior 
position.   
Positions supporting Victory Day celebration were based on two arguments. The 
first argument places the victory over Nazism as a reference point to present day stability 
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and links any alternative narratives to the concerns over the rights of Russians and revival 
of Nazism. The second line of thought portrays Victory Day as a people’s celebration 
with an emphasis on individual memories, thus attempting to rhetorically disconnect it 
from the Soviet regime or the present Russian politics.  
The more radical “Russian” party Latvian Russian Union mostly employs the first 
argument. The leader of the Latvian Russian Union, a current Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP) Tatjana Ždanoka builds Russian speakers’ identity around May 9 and 
portrays pluralism or other versions of history as aggression towards Russia and Russians. 
It also connects any alternative versions to rise of neo-Nazism, hence blocking debate in 
history.  
This May 9 is the 70th anniversary of the Victory. There are catastrophically few 
veterans remaining among us. The generation who survived the war, who bore its 
burden on their shoulders is passing away. I am talking about this change with 
anxiety because the living memory of witnesses in the public consciousness is 
replaced by scraps of impressions drawn from movies and newspapers. This is a 
dangerous moment, because the scale of the tragedy of the Second World War is 
becoming something abstract, and often embellished by artistic fiction and 
propaganda. The emphasis in assessing the perpetrators of the war and the role of 
the winners is shifting. Cases of diminishing of the role of the Red Army and the 
Soviet people in the defeat of Nazism are not uncommon. From the obsessive 
moral equalization of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, the bridge is gradually 
shifted to the rehabilitation and legalization of Nazism. But the main purpose of 
the revision of history is to find a theoretical and moral basis for a discriminatory, 
aggressive attitude towards modern Russia and the Russian communities in the 
EU.37 (Ždanoka, 2015) 
In this speech there is an attempt to securitize the memory of May 9. It asserts that the 
single “correct” memory is threatened by oblivion and other interpretations that are 
referred to as “propaganda”. Ždanoka delegitimises other narratives as it is characteristic 
to mnemonic warriors. The speech also constructs the possible oblivion or reformulation 
of May 9 as a common threat to Russia and Russians and transfers the past to the present 
politics. Questioning May 9 is seen as an attack on ethnic Russians today.  
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In the recent years, Harmony has become a more important actor in supporting 
the Victory Day celebration in Riga. The party has gradually side-lined the Latvian 
Russian Union and its leaders. The identity of the Russian speakers and Victory Day as a 
part of it plays an important role in party’s rhetoric. It is more tolerant to other versions 
of history, especially when those concern the level of individual memories of different 
groups. However, members of the party also link May 9 to present day events and the 
situation of Russian speakers in Latvia. Victory Day has entered official rhetoric more 
prominently because the leader of Harmony party and the mayor of Riga Nils Ušakovs 
attends the events every year and also does not avoid publicly defending the May 9 
celebration. Latvian media have also repeatedly published information on the party’s 
significant involvement in organizing and popularizing the Victory Day celebration via a 
foundation “9may.lv” and the foundation having received funds from Russia (e.g. “Ar 
«Saskaņu» saistītā”, 2015) which created even more resistance towards the celebration 
among many ethnic Latvians.  
Ušakovs’s statements portray May 9 as “people’s celebration” that is attended by 
masses of inhabitants of Latvia and commemoration of the war is based on individual 
memories of family members’ experiences and Nazi atrocities that must not be forgotten. 
There is an attempt to portray the celebration at the Victory Memorial as innocent of 
politics or any further reaching consequences. His speech at the Victory Memorial in Riga 
in 2015 starts by stating “…Victory Day 9 May is the stories of my father and my 
grandmother. Those are both of my grandfathers who fought at the front… It is family’s 
memory. Family’s memory is not related to geopolitics, political environment, ideology 
or propaganda.”38 (Ušakovs, 2015)  
The speech does acknowledge the repressive character of Stalinism (although not 
naming it directly) and the victims of two regimes but justifies the May 9 celebrations 
as the victory over the ultimate evil:  
20th century was a time of terrible dictatorships and bloody regimes. In the past 
century we learned about such words as Holocaust, genocide, concentration 
camps, mass repressions, mass deportations. Many European peoples became 
victims of these regimes, including the Latvian people. We in Latvia know what 
deportations and repressions are and we always have to cherish the memory of the 
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victims of all regimes but we have to remember that the Nazi regime was the 
absolute evil.39 (ibid.)  
His recognition of the suffering of Latvian people (yet, not ethnic Latvians in particular) 
is significant. It certainly reflects the cultural constraints that are around May 9 in Latvia 
and could be taken as an attempt at reconciliation of different memories. Moreover, in 
Ušakovs’s speeches there is an emphasis on Victory Day being a celebration in Latvia 
disconnecting it from Russia proper and the Soviet Union and presenting it as something 
characteristic to Latvia: “Victory Day in Riga on May 9 – it is a Latvian celebration. Not 
a Soviet celebration. Not a Russian celebration. But exactly Latvian celebration because 
hundreds of thousands of Latvian citizens, patriots of their country mark it.”40 (Ušakovs, 
2016) Another point is the emphasis on May 9 celebration not being a threat to Latvian 
statehood and a common future despite different opinions on history (ibid.; “Ušakovs: 
Cilvēki 9. maijā”, 2015).  
 However, the mayor of Riga has also made more controversial statements such as 
“Without the destruction of Nazism, without the victory in World War II, today we would 
not have our restored country and we would not have the possibility to celebrate May 4 
[Declaration on the Restoration of Re-Independence in 1990] and November 18 
[Independence Day of Latvia]”41 (“Ušakovs: Bez uzvaras”, 2016). This peculiar attempt 
to connect the World War II victory to the later history of Latvia was evaluated as absurd 
and provocative in a commentary to the media by the Latvian political scientist Ivars Ījabs 
(ibid.). Yet, this points to a problem that one can read also in the other statements. 
Namely, portraying the Victory Day as a celebration for everybody demonstrates a 
disregard of the Latvian memory of occupation and loss of independence as a national 
tragedy. The narrative universalizes Victory Day celebration and reveals a discursive 
strategy where the alleged depoliticizing of the commemoration allows to vilify the ones 
who hold a different opinion as unnecessarily politicizing an innocent ritual. In this sense 
it employs and enforces ethnic alienation because it presents Victory Day as a uniting 
factor for Latvian Russians while this very celebration is outside the Latvian state official 
narrative. Ušakovs’s is a warrior narrative also looking at the aspect that it represents the 
Soviet soldiers as nothing other than heroes and the events of 1945 as liberation from the 
Nazi without sufficient acknowledgement of other interpretations. Ušakovs’s statements 
also fall under the Russian narrative of the Soviet Union having played an important role 
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in enabling the emergence of modern Europe (see Mälksoo, 2009). Ušakovs also connects 
the present to the past and mentions the situation in Ukraine but in a rather different light 
than most Latvian politicians do. He depicts it as a tragic occurrence of military conflict 
in Europe - something that the veterans of the Soviet army in WWII fought for not to 
repeat.  
While Ždanoka in the quote above clearly founds her position on ethic alienation, 
Ušakovs stance is slightly different. Ušakovs’s Victory Day narrative, rather than 
building on alienation, is trying to include May 9 in the Latvian public space. However, 
it happens without sufficient engagement with the ways of remembering that are accepted 
among ethnic Latvians. If the rhetoric is an attempt to normalize the Victory Day 
celebration in the Latvian public space and reconcile the conflicting memories, then it 
fails to accommodate or acknowledge the Latvian dominant narrative. Thus, it is a 
mnemonic warrior position. Nevertheless, there is a strong sense the “ethnic alienation 
narrative” expressed by Ušakovs when speaking about the community that celebrates 
May 9: “The state consistently ignores these people and after that it wonders about 
integration problems and blames the education system.”42 (“Ušakovs komentē”, 2015) 
Likewise, ethnic alienation narrative is expressed by other members of Harmony, for 
example, Jānis Urbanovičs (2016), the head of Harmony’s fraction in Saeima. 
 In 2012 a popular initiative on “restoration of the true Victory square” was started 
and it reached the parliament in 2016. This initiative was supported by the National 
Alliance, including its ministers and proposed to reconstruct the Victory Park according 
to the project that was created in 1930s (“Par Uzvaras pieminekļa”, 2013; “Saeimas 
komisija”, 2016). It was rejected by Saeima but, nevertheless, created tension between 
both sides. In relation to this initiative, Urbanovičs (2016) expressed resentment that the 
Russian minority has suppressed its own take on history: “Who knows, maybe the ones 
who were recruited in the Red Army themselves (and their relatives) take for granted the 
opinion that they are worse than the fellow nationals who fought on Hitler’s side.”43 He 
also emphasizes the importance of Victory Day for the Russian ethnicity as sacred 
memories about the victims of the war. These mnemonic warrior statements are a 
response to what is deemed unjust suppression of the memory of Latvian Russians. 
Rhetorically they are very similar to the positon on March 16 voiced by the National 
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Alliance in relation to the Latvian legion. Thus, both sides see the recognition of the other 
as a threat to their own memory.  
In sum, Harmony’s rhetoric aims at acknowledgement of May 9 as a legitimate 
day of celebration in Latvia, something that would be unacceptable to most Latvians. 
Portraying it as a universal celebration, moreover, ignores the feelings that it may raise in 
many Latvians. Besides, Harmony’s framing is consistent with how May 9 has evolved 
from commemoration to a more festival-like “people’s celebration” in Russia and in parts 
of the former USSR (Procevska, 2011, p. 329). However, there are attempts to disconnect 
it from Russia and an emphasis on May 9 not being a threat to Latvian state which are 
addressing the fears that drive the antipathy among many ethnic Latvians against this 
commemoration ritual. At the same time Harmony’s involvement in organization of 
May 9 celebration at the Victory monument in Riga is a consolidation of the Russian 
speaking minority around a narrative that is external to the Latvian state institutions and 
contributes to alienation rather than dialogue and integration. Hanovs (2016) warns that 
May 9 has become a platform for building alternative institutions to the state such as the 
Congress of Noncitizens which claim to represent the part of population that has been 
excluded and discriminated by the Latvian majority.   
Taken together all the above mentioned positions on the end of WWII again 
constitute a fractured memory regime with three dominating positions. The first narrative 
is mostly expressed by Latvian centrist political parties like Unity and can be 
characterized as abnegator but has some pluralist features. The second is a warrior 
position that is voiced by more nationalistic Latvian political actors while the third is also 
a warrior stance that mainly characterizes Latvian Russian political actors. These three 
narratives are broken down according to Bernhard and Kubik’s model in table 3.1. Thus 
within Latvian political forces present more varied positions. The warrior positions 
voiced by the Latvian Russian Union and Harmony express resentment with the state of 
affairs and link the May 9 celebration to rights and status of Russians in Latvia. Thus, 
they touch the more fundamental questions that relate to the identity of Latvian Russians. 
Even though these three types lead to a fractured memory regime, there are some nuances 
within these narratives that voice slightly more pluralistic attitudes and occasional 
acknowledgement of the other group, especially when individuals memories are 
concerned. In addition, some political actors like the Latvian President between 2011 and 
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2015 Andris Bērziņš have taken a pluralist stance and there is a rather neutral attitude 
towards May 8. Therefore, I also include a pluralist position in table 4.2 even though it is 
rather weak.  
 
Table 4.2 Narratives on commemoration of the end of WWII  
 Warriors I: 
Victimization of 
Latvians  
Warriors II: 
Victory over 
Nazism 
Pluralists: 
acknowledging 
two positions  
Abnegators: 
Commemorate 
end of WWII on 
May 8   
Who are the 
participants in 
memory 
politics?  
Latvians – the 
collective victims 
of Soviet 
occupation 
versus those who 
celebrate 
occupation of 
Latvia and who 
arrived here 
under Soviet 
occupation. 
Those who want 
to celebrate 
victory over 
Nazism and 
commemorate 
their relatives 
versus the ones 
who try to deny 
them this 
possibility.  
All of us who 
commemorate 
the victims of 
WWII that 
could be found 
on both sides.  
Those (radicals) 
who use memory 
battles for 
political 
manipulations.  
What is the 
predominant 
vision of 
collective 
memory?  
Latvians as 
victims of Soviet 
and Nazi 
occupations. Red 
Army was an 
occupying force. 
Latvia marks end 
of WWII on May 
8 as the rest of 
Europe.   
May 9 was as 
the victory over 
Nazism that 
should be 
celebrated by 
everyone. 
WWII in Latvia 
ended with 
liberation from 
Nazism.  
There are 
different 
interpretations 
but they all see 
WWII as a 
tragedy and 
recognize 
victims of 
totalitarian 
regimes on both 
sides. Both May 
8 and May 9 
can be marked.  
There is no need 
to discuss the 
past. The end of 
WWII should be 
commemorated 
on May 8 while 
May 9 is 
European Day 
and these should 
not be 
politicized.   
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When are the 
events to be 
remembered 
happening? 
Latvian state is 
still struggling 
with the 
consequences of 
occupation. The 
present is seen 
through the lens 
of occupation 
and restoration of 
independence. 
Victory Day is 
connected to 
rights of 
Russian 
speakers in 
present Latvia.     
There are 
different 
reference points 
in the past for 
different groups 
of society.  
 
It is unimportant. 
The present is 
more important 
than the past.   
How is the 
mnemonic 
contest to be 
carried out? 
What are the 
culturally 
prescribed 
strategies of 
action?  
It is simply 
wrong to 
celebrate Victory 
Day because the 
true version of 
history is that 
Latvia was 
occupied by a 
brutal regime.  
The right to 
celebrate May 9 
must be 
defended 
against 
illegitimate 
attempts to 
rewrite history.  
 
Both groups 
need to respect 
each other’s 
memory. 
History and 
memory should 
be more widely 
discussed, 
presenting 
different 
positions.   
Official 
commemoration 
is May 8. Those 
who want can 
mark May 9 but 
engaging in 
discussions is 
unproductive and 
even dangerous.  
Why is it 
worthwhile or 
not 
worthwhile to 
engage in 
mnemonic 
struggle?  
Latvian state has 
regained its 
independence for 
Latvians to enjoy 
freedom again. 
May 9 is part of 
the past wrongs 
and a tool of 
present Russia’s 
soft power. Thus, 
it poses a threat 
to Latvia and 
Latvians.  
May 9 is 
important for 
Latvian Russian 
speakers. The 
right to 
celebrate May 9 
is part of the 
struggle for 
improving the 
rights of 
Russian 
speakers in 
Latvia.   
The mnemonic 
conflict has 
negative impact 
on social 
cohesion and 
poses a threat of 
escalation.  
Engaging in 
memory politics 
will just 
exacerbate the 
conflict. 
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Which political 
actors voice the 
position? 
Only actors 
representing 
“Latvian” 
political forces.  
Only actors 
representing 
Russian 
speakers. 
However, slight 
variation exists 
in the positions 
within the 
group.  
Elements of this 
narrative can be 
found among 
politicians 
representing 
both 
ethnolinguistic 
groups.   
Abnegator 
position 
regarding May 9 
is mainly taken 
by Latvian 
actors.   
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.3. Discussion of results  
Summarizing the results, ethnic cleavage indeed dominates the mnemonic field of Latvia 
regarding WWII commemoration. Yet, in line with some of the earlier research (Cheskin, 
2012; Kaprāns & Procevska, 2013), analysis of the commemorative rituals of the 
Legionnaire Day and the remembrance of the end of WWII suggests that differences in 
mnemonic positions exist not only between but also within both ethnolinguistic groups. 
Both days have also departed from their initial meaning of commemoration of the 
participants and victims of WWII. In the rhetoric of politicians they are connected to such 
present issues as national or ethnic identity, national security, ethnic alienation, minority 
rights and integration. Bernhard and Kubik (2014) state that collective memory is 
constructed by a “purposive use of selective remembering and forgetting” and that can 
also be observed in the official memory narratives put forward by political actors in Latvia 
(p. 8). The actors pick certain moments or facts that best fit their claim to power.  
Both groups present more moderate and more radical mnemonic positions. The 
leading government party during the analysed timeframe Unity and its Prime Minister 
Laimdota Straujuma have taken more of a pluralist stance regarding May 8 and an 
abnegator stance on May 9 as well as March 16. President Bērziņš also attempted to 
reconcile both groups and construct May 8 as a common remembrance day. National 
Alliance, in contrast, are clear warriors in relation to all mnemonic events. On the other 
side of the spectrum, Harmony is mostly an abnegator on the questions that are essential 
to Latvian narrative of history but becomes a warrior in relation to May 9 and issues that 
concern the identity of Russian speakers. This can be explained by the fact that “attacks” 
on Latvian memory would only distance the party even more from ethnic Latvian voters. 
Further, Kaprāns and Saulītis (2017) show that the majority of ethnic Russians do not 
want to engage in mnemonic conflicts while Victory Day rituals – and thus also the 
politicians’ support to it - is essential for the Russian speaking electorate.  Yet, mnemonic 
actors with very different positions can be found within the Harmony too. The radical 
positions presented by Latvian Russian Union are becoming more marginalized. 
However, they still find political representation. In addition, not all actors correspond to 
the ideal types. For example, even though Unity’s politicians have expressed acceptance 
of differences in how various groups interpret history, their overall position is still more 
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warrior-like. They are seeing history in ethnic terms where the point of reference is the 
Latvian unique suffering under two totalitarian regimes. Similarly, also Harmony’s 
positions include some pluralistic points while overall the rhetoric is dominated by ethnic 
alienation and support to May 9. 
The discourse of Latvian political actors presents the country and Latvian people 
as negatively chosen. Latvians perceive themselves as a “threatened majority” (Zepa et 
al., 2005) even 25 years after the restoration of independence and claim “exclusive rights” 
to traumatic experience (Hanovs, 2012). Such ardent reaction of Latvian political actors 
against Victory Day as the proposal to remove Victory monument signals about insecurity 
about their own collective memory. Likewise, the social memory survey shows that 
generally Latvians are less likely than Russian speakers to accept different interpretations 
of history (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017) that might also indicate a greater insecurity. In line 
with Assmann (2004) who states that small nations build their mnemonic narrative around 
defeats and a “victim identity” (p. 27), Latvian politicians emphasise the suffering under 
two occupations and the nation’s heroic resistance. This position with the ethnic prism 
attached to it enables to exclude other narratives of history. 
The political actors representing Russian speakers, in contrast, build their 
narratives on the interpretations that resonate within the minority group. More than 60% 
of Russian speakers celebrate Victory Day (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017) and it also has 
become an important counter-position to the official state narratives which create feeling 
of alienation among Russian speakers (Cheskin, 2012). In the political rhetoric this 
alienation is used to unify the Russian speakers, and the Victory Day itself is connected 
to the rights of ethnic minorities. Latvian Russian Union rhetorically connects Latvia’s 
Russian speaker community to Russia and all Russians abroad. Harmony, even though a 
less militant warrior and often an abnegator, has not been building a more “Latvian” or 
European narrative either and the May 9 celebration in Riga has largely assumed a 
character that resembles the Victory Day celebration in Russia. However, Cheskin (2012) 
highlights some indications of integration of the Latvian official history narratives in 
party’s rhetoric. He states that Harmony has changed its views of history due to “top-
down pressures” while politicians operating exclusively in Russian environment would 
not have a reason to do so. He further argues that “because HC wish to access political 
power in Latvia they have adopted more conciliatory positions which find greater accord 
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with the official memory-myths of the Latvian state” (p. 579). This is demonstrated, for 
instance, by the recognition of repressions carried out by the Soviet regime.  
 Looking at the two commemorative days examined in this study, May 9 certainly 
presents a more fundamental mnemonic fissure. While the memory of the Latvian Legion 
is still unsettled, March 16 is somewhat losing its prominence. The results of this study 
show that March 16 is increasingly abnegated by Latvian politicians apart from members 
of the National Alliance. Abnegator position taken by other leading Latvian political 
forces can be explained by "purposive forgetting" (Bernhard & Kubik, p. 14). The 
commemoration contradicts Latvia’s European orientation and is perceived as a source 
of provocations. Latvian politicians are unwilling to discuss the time of Nazi occupation 
similarly as they are unlikely to engage in deeper analysis of collaboration with the Soviet 
regime. Moreover, public opinion surveys also show fatigue towards the annual 
controversies around the legionnaire march and indicate that attitudes towards March 16 
among Latvians are not unanimous (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017). Warrior position does not 
have the potential to bring significant political benefits because the issue is salient only 
to a part of Latvian society. In addition, attitudes towards March 16 show that the date is 
not as essential to ethnic Latvians as May 9 is for Russian speakers even though both days 
are often linked in political rhetoric. In contrast to May 9, the Legionnaire Day does not 
concern such questions as recognition of occupation and is not as crucial to Latvian 
national identity as May 9 has become for Russian speakers. Therefore, political elites 
find it easier to take an abnegator stance on it.  
At the same time, the abnegator stance of mainstream Latvian politicians in 2014 
created a vacuum and a lack of a balanced debate on the role of the Latvian legion. This 
was filled by the National Alliance which is an ardent promoter and exploiter of the 
Legionnaire hero myth described in detail by Zelče (2011). Their willingness to explain 
the rest of the world the truth about the Latvian legion perfectly matches Bernhard and 
Kubik's description of mnemonic warriors. In line with Assmann (2004) they construct 
the narrative around a “tragic hero” who unsuccessfully fought for independence (p. 27) 
and were later unjustly repressed. Another argument that cautions against the abnegation 
of March 16, as pointed out by Cheskin (2012), is that avoidance to talk about the Latvian 
Legion risks that Russian speakers can become even more heavily reliant on the positions 
expressed in the Russian media if information comes only from these sources.   
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Regarding May 9, the most important question for reconciliation is whether or not 
the two narratives – liberation from Nazism and occupation - can coexist. Some political 
discourse includes recognition of individual memories and the right to commemorate the 
victims on both sides. This is also in line with the public opinion demonstrating that both 
ethnolinguistic groups are more tolerant to individual veterans. There is within group 
variation in how Red Army soldiers and Latvian legionnaires are perceived and rather 
large proportions of both Latvians and Russian speakers tend to see all WWII participants 
as victims or both victims and heroes (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017).  
However, when it comes to the clash of occupation and liberation narratives 
characterizing the end of WWII, mnemonic reconciliation is much more difficult. On the 
one hand, as Pettai (2016) argues, questioning the occupation fact also questions the 
legitimacy of the restoration of independence. For all Latvian political actors occupation 
and re-establishment of independence are the basis of the current state. Therefore, the 
narratives that deny occupation are in any case incompatible with this official position. 
Even though some Latvians are ready to be pluralistic to a certain extent, they are warriors 
if the occupation question is at stake. On the other hand, recognizing the fact that the Red 
army simply occupied Latvia at the end of WWII for Russian speakers means that they 
“have no morally and legally justifiable place in modern Latvia” (Cheskin, 2012, p. 569). 
On the basis of his survey results, Cheskin proposes that it is easier for the Russian 
speakers to accept a narrative that includes occupation and liberation simultaneously 
(ibid.). However, such a narrative would be contradictory and might not initially resonate 
with the perceptions of either groups because the fundamental understandings of 
occupation and liberation are incompatible. Such a position would be unlikely to bring 
benefit to political actors.  
Solidifying the Russian-speaker historical narrative around Victory Day has 
elicited defensive reactions among Latvian political forces. This was amplified by the 
armed conflict in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. While mainstream Latvian 
political elites showed more tolerance and became mnemonic abnegators in order to avoid 
tensions, nationalistically-minded political actors saw it as an opportunity to take even 
fiercer warrior positions and portray the moderate parties as weak and incapable of 
defending national history. They also denounced the Europeanization of Latvian memory 
at the same time striving to reaffirm Latvia’s place in Europe and contrasting it to Russia 
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and Victory Day celebration as the “other” and the non-European. National Alliance also 
reinforced ethnic tensions in their mnemonic positions. The ethnic composition of Latvia 
was framed as one of the unjust consequences of the Soviet occupation. National Alliance 
is currently one of the largest and most stable political parties and it is also a part of the 
ruling coalition. Hence, the narratives that it promotes cannot be considered marginal but 
they are actually shared by a sizeable part of Latvian population with the party occupying 
21 seats in the 100 seat parliament. 
Another question is to what extent the construction of May 8 as a neutral 
commemoration date has been successful. Bernhard and Kubik (2014) state that 
“[e]ffective positions are those that are consonant with the cultural terrain of target 
groups, those that resonate with their images of the past” (p. 12). May 8 is certainly a 
more inclusive commemorative day than May 9 in a sense that it fits into the Latvian 
narrative of two equally condemnable totalitarian regimes, simultaneously marking the 
defeat of Nazism in Europe that is important for Russian speakers. Yet, the formal 
commemorations on May 8 and the initiative of Bērziņš to hold a meeting of the few still 
alive war veterans have not extended to wider society. A possible explanation is that 
May 8 does not resonate with either of the groups or it even conflicts with the memories 
of both. Furthermore, warrior positions in general are much louder and more solidly 
formulated than the attempts at reconciliation. In line with Bernhard and Kubik (2014), 
even a single mnemonic warrior creates a fractured memory regime. Also, neither PM 
Straujuma nor President Bērziņš possessed the ability to present their positions eloquently 
and convincingly but rather seemed to be doubting between different interpretations of 
history themselves.  
This lack of support to a common ritual reflects “cultural constraints” (Bernhard 
& Kubik, 2014) that limit mnemonic actors’ operation in the field of official memory. In 
Latvia these constraints are first of all the ethnic divide itself and second the two different 
“repertoires” of how history can be interpreted that arise from this divide. Mälksoo (2009) 
has argued that pluralistic, democratic memory is the only way to settle mnemonic 
conflicts because “attempts to invent a shared past only tend to provoke more or less 
violent expressions of difference” (p. 673). Kattago (2010) similarly suggests that the 
only way to overcome the mnemonic divisions is to resort to a pluralistic understanding 
of memory in a truly democratic public space. In her opinion, democracy is not 
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characterized by consensus but the possibility to disagree while seeking a single truth 
about the past means silencing those who disagree. Nonetheless, also mnemonic 
pluralism requires acceptance and recognition of different visions of history on the basis 
of common values which as the March 16 and May 9 events present, is not the case in the 
Latvian political environment.  
 
5.1. Conclusion  
This thesis is a case study of memory politics in Latvia, employing the theoretical 
framework of Berhard and Kubik (2014). The empirical case of this study is the 
commemorative rituals of March 16, May 8 and May 9 that represent mnemonic 
cleavages in WWII memory between Latvians and the country’s sizeable Russian 
speaking minority. The analysis presented in this study looks at how the diversity of 
mnemonic positions within both ethno-linguistic groups is reflected in the political 
discourse or in Bernhard and Kubik’s (2014) terms, how the memory regime within both 
ethnolinguistic groups is constituted.  Next to that, the existence of interpretations of 
history that both sides accept and which present opportunities of mnemonic reconciliation 
is also examined.   
The overall conclusion is that both March 16 and May 9 present a fractured 
memory regime in Latvia. The mnemonic cleavages are drawn along ethnic lines but 
within the ethnolinguistic groups different positions were found as well. Nonetheless, 
political forces employ warrior positions that constitute the mnemonic division in 
Latvians and ethnic Russians. Despite that several mnemonic abnegators and pluralists 
were found among both Latvian and minority political forces, each of the groups also 
presented a strong warrior narrative that is hostile to the positions of the other group. In 
other words, the parties that are designated as “Russian” support and promote different 
history narratives than the “Latvian” parties. Moreover, the narratives supported by the 
Russian speakers and their political representatives to a significant extent oppose the 
official state position, making the cleavage more fundamental. Yet, while May 9 is 
becoming a point of more intense mnemonic contestation and gaining more prominence, 
March 16 is increasingly abnegated by major political forces.  
In this analysis, few unifying positons were found. Apart from the common view 
that WWII brought suffering and there were victims among all ethnicities, the mnemonic 
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narratives are contradictory. A common position on March 16 is distancing from it and 
leaving the commemoration to the social and individual level of memory. May 9, in 
contrast, is becoming increasingly important for the Russian speaking minority and is 
gaining more support. These developments create insecurity among Latvians, causing 
some radicalization around Latvian national positions.  
Mnemonic pluralism is often seen as the preferable way of avoiding mnemonic 
conflicts in Latvia. Nevertheless, it is unclear if Latvia’s society is ready and willing to 
engage in mnemonic discussions and deeper assessment of 20th century history. The 
social memory survey has shown that the majority of both Latvians and Russian speakers 
rather prefer sweeping memory issues under the rug (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017). The 
analysis presented in this study demonstrated that Latvian mainstream political elites 
often also prefer this position. If more and more political actors choose abnegator position 
and also society shows fatigue of mnemonic conflicts, employing memory for political 
purposed might become unprofitable.  
Yet, whether it is the best solution to mnemonic conflicts and if a healthy, 
democratic society can be built without a proper settlement with its own past, remains a 
question. Besides, silencing of the conflict is more likely to happen regarding March 16 
than May 9 which enjoys wide support in the Russophone segment of Latvian society. 
Further research should be done on how the top-down narratives proliferate in social 
memory as well as what the attitudes towards other commemorative days are. It could 
reveal if, for example, November 18, the Proclamation Day of the Republic of Latvia 
which is seen rather positively by the ethnic non-Latvians (Kaprāns & Saulītis, 2017), 
could serve a unifying commemorative practice.   
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APPENDIX I  
Quotes from primary sources in original language  
1 “Latvijas valsts pamatā ir nācija ar kopīgu savas vēstures izpratni, cieņu pret latviešu 
valodu un kultūru.”  
2 “Latvijā un Rīgā visi godās latviešu kultūras tradīcijas, nacionālos simbolus un 
latviešu karavīru piemiņu.” 
3 “Mēs uzstājamies pret jebkurām neonacisma izpausmēm un Otrā pasaules kara 
rezultātu revīzijas. Antihitleriskās koalīcijas veterāniem ir jāsaņem oficiālais statuss un 
atvieglojumi.” 
4 “Mums ir jāskatās arī mūsu sadarbības partneru ES valstu reakcija par to, ka valdība 
varētu atbalstīt nacismu vai fašismu, ko Eiropa uztver ļoti sāpīgi.” 
5 “…necilvēcīgas represijas un nepārtrauktu teroru, gan okupējošā Vācijas nacistiskā 
vara, gan arī PSRS totalitārā vara, pretēji starptautiskajām tiesībām, nelikumīgi 
mobilizēja vai piespieda daudzus Latvijas iedzīvotājus pievienoties vienas vai otras valsts 
bruņotajiem spēkiem" 
6 "Valdības pārstāvji un koalīcijas partijas, esam Latvijas patrioti un respektējam visus 
karā kritušos karavīrus. Latvijā oficiālā karavīru piemiņas diena ir 11.novembris, nevis 
16.marts. Tāpēc visi, kas vēlas izrādīt cieņu kritušajiem karavīriem 16.martā, var doties 
apmeklēt Lestenes brāļu kapus, tādejādi nepakļaujot Latviju nevajadzīgiem provokācijas 
draudiem," 
7 “Šis pasākums, kā zināms, jau sen ir pārvērties par pasākumu, kur abu pušu radikāļi 
cenšas viens ar otru konfrontēt, un es uzskatu, ka ministru klātbūtne tur it pilnīgi lieka. 
Tas tikai šo konfrontāciju var saasināt un tieši tā, to nesaprot ne austrumos, ne rietumos” 
8 “16. marta gājiena jēga ir ne tikai paust skaidru nosodījumu 2 totalitāriem pagātnes 
režīmiem, kas ir nodarījuši milzum daudz posta Latvijai un pasaulei, bet arī vērsties pret 
fašisma atdzimšanu šodien.” 
9 “Katrā ziņā šogad 16. marts nebūs tikai datums, kurā pieminam kritušos par Latviju. Tas 
būs protests pret agresori Krieviju, un tas nozīmē, ka nepieciešamība piedalīties 16. marta 
pasākumos ir daudz lielāka nekā citus gadus.” 
10 “Tā vietā, lai diplomāti pasaulei skaidrotu latviešu leģiona vēsturi, valsts ir netieši 
padevusies Krievijas propagandai.” 
                                                 
  
75 
 
                                                                                                                                               
11 “Cīnītāji pret okupācijas varām nacistu un staļinistu laikā saglabāja Latvijas neatkarības 
ideju. Viņi šo ideju arī nodeva nākamajām paaudzēm. Bez šī procesa mums nebūtu tādas 
Atmodas, kāda mums bija, un varbūt nebūtu arī atjaunota Latvijas Republika, bet valsts, 
kura atdalījusies no PSRS.” 
12 “Histēriskā vēršanās pret 16. martu tik ļoti kontrastē ar atbildīgo personu klusēšanu 9. 
maija sakarībā, ka dažbrīd liekas, darīšana ir nevis ar neatkarīgas Latvijas valdību, bet ar 
LPSR pašpārvaldi. [...] Ukrainā nebija nedz 16.marta, nedz “pazemojošu” naturalizācijas 
eksāmenu, nedz nepilsoņu un vienalga Krievija atrada iemeslu, lai ievestu tur savu 
karaspēku. Pie tam skandējot to pašu, ko vienmēr – cīņu pret fašismu.” 
13 “Pakļaujoties Krievijas un tās piektās kolonnas spiedienam, Saeima 2000. gadā svītroja 
16. martu no atzīmējamo dienu saraksta, vienlaikus pret militārpersonām un 
amatpersonām, kuras tomēr uzdrošinājās 16. martā kopā ar leģionāriem iet atceres gājienā 
līdz Brīvības piemineklim, izvēršot represijas un kaunināšanas kampaņu “Latvijas 
starptautiskā tēla diskreditēšanā”.”  
14 "Mūsu tēvi karoja pret nacismu, bet tagad tos, kas bija kolaboranti, nosauc par 
varoņiem. Tas rada sašķeltību sabiedrībā. Vēstures pārskatīšana tagad notiek visur un tas 
ir bīstami sabiedrībai." 
15 “В Латвии, к сожалению, существует героизация легионеров Ваффен СС, 
которых чествуют как борцов за независимость Латвии, хотя общеизвестно, что 
они давали клятву лично Адольфу Гитлеру и сражались за Третий Рейх, а не 
свободу Латвии.” 
16 "Piemēram, nenosodot latviešu leģionāru gājienu 16.martā, 9.maija svinības pārvērstas 
par aģitācijas šovu, kam nav ideoloģiskā piepildījuma.” 
17“Политикам проще говорить об угрозе Москвы или об угрозе возрождения 
фашизма, чем о социальных делах.” 
18 “Кстати, в легион призывали граждан Латвии не по национальному признаку, а 
по паспорту. Из Латгалии очень много русских и русскоязычных призвали.” 
19 “…были страшные репрессии против жителей Латвии, и отношение к 
большевистской власти было, мягко выражаясь, негативным. Поэтому какая-то 
часть пошла в Легион добровольно, но абсолютное большинство было 
мобилизовано, и люди могли выбирать между Легионом и концлагерем.” 
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20 “Более того, больше миллиона граждан Советского Союза воевали на стороне 
немцев. У меня мама родом из Краснодара, и там из казаков было сформировано 
подразделение из 250 000 человек, которые воевали на стороне немцев. Это 
больше, чем латышей, литовцев и эстонцев вместе взятых. Поэтому все сложно. 
Через латышский легион практически у каждого в Латвии кто-нибудь из 
родственников прошел. Это часть семейной памяти. Но использовать людей, 
которые стали жертвами истории, в современной политике, чтобы заработать 
какие-то очки, недопустимо.” 
21 "...tieši 8.maijs ir atbilstoša diena, lai izteiktu aicinājumu visiem Latvijas kara 
veterāniem pulcēties vienotā piemiņas pasākumā un kopīgi pieminēt visus nacisma un 
komunisma upurus Otrajā pasaules karā.”  
22 “8.maijā, atceroties Otrā pasaules kara beigas un pieminot tā upurus, šajā dienā teiksim 
paldies cilvēkiem, kuri izcīnīja šo uzvaru un deva iespēju atvērt jaunu lappusi pasaules 
vēsturē.” 
23 “Jo Latvijas sevišķajā situācijā ir daudzi karotāji, kas ir bijuši spiesti abās pusēs karot 
vai karot brālis pret brāli.”  
24 “Tāpēc es gribu uzsvērt, ka šis ir ļoti sarežģīts jautājums un šeit Latvijā viņš ir vēl 
sarežģītāks kā jebkurā citā vietā, jo Latvijas cieta no abām lielvarām.”  
25 “Karš bija vienas totalitāras varas izraisīts ārprāts, un pēc tam Latvijai bija ilgi gadi 
nebrīvē. Mēs nosodām abas šīs totalitārās varas – gan nacistus, gan padomju totalitārismu. 
Un tas mums jāatceras.” 
26 “Pirms 25 gadiem mēs pieredzējām principiālu taisnīguma uzvaru pār netaisnību un 
patiesības augšāmcelšanos. Ar Augstākās padeomes pieņemto lēmumu par Latvijas 
Republikas neatkarības atjaunošanu, kuru varmācīgi bija pārtraukusi padaomju 
okupācija. Un ne jau katra nācija reiz zaudētu valsti spēj no jauna atjaunot uz tikpat 
stipriem pamatiem. Latvijas valsts neatkarība tika atjaunota uz 1918. gada 18. novembra 
republikas pamatos liktajām vērtībām: latviešu valoda, latviešu kultūra, mīlestība pret 
savu zemi, tautu un savu valsti. Un latviešu tauta saglabā mūžīgās vērtības visgrūtākajos 
apstākļos. Par to liecina mūsu izraušanās no pusgadsimtu ilgās apspiestības un 
stagnācijas.”  
27 “Ir ekstrēmistu grupas, kas 9.maijā vienmēr grib izraisīt provokācijas. Šajos datumos - 
16.[martā] un 9.maijā - ir dažādas iedzīvotāju grupas un dažādi uzsvari. Krievvalodīgie 
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iedzīvotāji vēsturiski atzīmē krievu tautas uzvaru pār fašismu, bet Latvijai tā ir okupācijas 
sākšana.”  
28 “Protams, koalīcijā nākas meklēt politiskus kompromisus, taču ir lietas, ko grūti 
pieņemt. Man personīgi nav pieņemama “Vienotības” attieksme pret 16. martu. Valdības 
vadītājas Laimdotas Straujumas aicinājums 9. maijā “būt tolerantiem un iejūtīgiem” ļoti 
kontrastē ar to, ko viņa parasti runā pirms 16. marta.” 
29“Tie ir cilvēki, kuriem ir par ko pateikties PSRS okupācijai. Bez tās viņi šeit vispār 
nebūtu. […] 9. maijs Latvijā ir PSRS okupācijas armijas godināšanas svētki, kuriem ar 
mirušo piemiņu ir tikai dekoratīvs sakars. Īstā 9. maija būtība ir Krievijas impēriskās 
varenības svinēšana ar «neuzvaramo armiju – atbrīvotāju» kā centrālo elementu. Ja 
Maskavā tas ir pašsaprotami, tad Rīgā tā ir izaicinoša necieņas demonstrācija pret šo 
savulaik okupēto valsti un tās pamatiedzīvotājiem.” 
30 “To paaudzi, kas te ar konkrētiem mērķiem ieceļoja padomju laikā, mēs neizmainīsim, 
taču nav saprotams, kāpēc pie pieminekļa nāk jaunieši. Tad ir jautājums - ko šiem 
jauniešiem māca par Latvijas vēsturi un simboliem? Ģimene ir viens, taču otrs ir valstiskā 
audzināšana skolās.” 
31 “9.maijā Eiropas dienā kā jaunas, mierīgas un uz sadarbību orientētas Eiropas simbols 
tiek atzīmēta Eiropas Savienības pamatu likšana. Mūsu platuma grādos daļā sabiedrības 
Otrā pasaules kara traģēdija tiek pārvērsta iespaidīgā propagandas izrādē.” 
32 “Turpretī Uzvaras diena tās mūsdienu izpausmē ir Putina Krievijas un politisko uzskatu 
kopuma, kuru dažkārt pieņemts dēvēt par putinismu, centrālie svētki. Primāri šie svētki 
ir domāti Putina Krievijas pavalstniekiem un etniskajiem krieviem ārpus Krievijas, bet 
sekundāri – ikvienam, kurš ir neapmierināts un vīlies liberālajos Rietumos. 
33 “Šodien, kad par hibrīdkara draudiem atklāti runā Eiropā, Latvijai skaidri jāapzinās 
sava rietumnieciskā orientācija.”  
34 “Cienīsim kara veterānus, kuri vēlas pieminēt savus mirušos biedrus bez naida celšanas 
šobrīd. Cienīsim arī kara veterānu un kritušo tuviniekus, kuri vēlas kara veterāniem 
piebiedroties un pieminēt savējos. Atcerēsimies tos baigos apstākļus, kuros karavīri tika 
šķirti no savām ģimenēm, ievainoti, sakropļoti un nonāvēti. Aicinām pieminēt karā 
cietušos, nevis viņus nosodīt. Viņi neuzsāka karu un neturpina to tagad! Aicinām arī visus 
citus neturpināt šo karu un neizmantot tā sekas savtīgiem un provokatīviem nolūkiem.”  
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35 “Aicinot par kopīgu dienu Otrā pasaules kara upuru atcerei izvēlēties 8. maiju, mēs 
respektējam kara veterānu vēlmi savus kritušos biedrus atsevišķi pieminēt arī 16. martā 
un 9. maijā.” 
36 “Stiprināsim mieru Latvijā ar svētsvinīgiem Otrajā pasaules karā kritušo karavīru 
piemiņas brīžiem – neatkarīgi no tā, kur, kad un kurā pusē viņi cīnījušies un kur un kad 
viņus tagad Latvijā pieminam.” 
37 “Нынешнее 9 мая — это день 70-летия Победы. Ветеранов остается среди нас 
катастрофически мало. Уходит из жизни поколение, пережившие войну, вынесшее 
на своих плечах все ее тяготы. Я с тревогой говорю об этой смене, ибо живая память 
свидетелей в общественном сознании замещается обрывками впечатлений, 
почерпнутых из кино и газет. Это опасный момент, поскольку масштаб трагедии 
Второй мировой войны становится чем-то отвлеченным, а зачастую и 
приукрашенным за счет художественного вымысла и пропаганды. Смещаются 
акценты в оценке виновников войны и роли победителей. Нередки случаи 
уничижения роли Красной Армии и советского народа в разгроме нацизма. Новым 
стандартом для стран Восточной Европы становится недоброжелательное 
отношение к памяти советских солдат, воевавших с нацизмом. От навязчивого 
морального уравнивания нацисткой Германии и советской России постепенно 
перебрасывается мостик к реабилитации и легализации нацизма. Но главной целью 
ревизии истории является подведение теоретической и моральной базы под 
дискриминационное, агрессивное отношение к современной России и русским 
общинам в ЕС.” 
38 “Для меня 9 мая, День Победы 9 мая это рассказы моей бабушки и моего отца. 
Это оба моих деда, которые воевали на фронте. […] Эта память моей семьи. 
Семейная память не зависит от политической конъюнктуры, геополитической 
ситуации или идеологической пропаганды.” 
39 “20-ый век был временем страшных диктатур и кровавых режимов. Именно в 
прошлом веке мы узнали такие слова как Холокост, геноцид, концентрационные 
лагеря. Массовые репрессии, массовые депортации. Многие народы стали 
жертвами этих режимов. Среди них и народ Латвии. Мы в Латвии не понаслышке 
знаем, что такое репрессии и депортации. Мы всегда должны чтить память жертв 
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всех режимов. Но при этом мы должны помнить о том, что режим нацистский был 
абсолютным злом.” 
40 “День Победы в Риге 9 мая — это латвийский праздник! Не советский праздник. 
Не российский праздник. А именно латвийский праздник, потому что его отмечают 
сотни тысяч граждан Латвии, патриотов своей страны.” 
41 “Bez nacisma sagrāves, bez uzvaras Otrajā pasaules karā mums šodien nebūtu arī 
atjaunotas valsts, nebūtu iespējas svinēt 4.maiju un 18.novembri. Tāpēc mēs vienmēr 
pieminēsim jūsu varoņdarbu.” 
42 "Valsts šos cilvēkus konsekventi ignorē un pēc tam brīnās par integrācijas neveiksmēm, 
vainojot izglītības sistēmu."  
43 “Kas zina, varbūt tie, kuri tika rekrutēti Sarkanajā armijā, paši (un viņu radi) jau kā 
pašsaprotamu ir pieņēmuši viedokli, ka ir sliktāki nekā Hitlera pusē karojošie tautieši?” 
